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CONSTITUTIONALLY INCAPABLE: PAROLE
BOARDS AS SENTENCING COURTS
Mae C. Quinn*

ABSTRACT
Courtroom sentencing, as part of the judicial process, is a long-standing
norm in the justice system of the United States. But this basic criminal law
precept is currently under quiet attack. This is because some states are now
allowing parole boards to step in to decide criminal penalties without first
affording defendants lawful judicial branch sentencing proceedings and
sentences. These outside-of-court punishment decisions are occurring in the
cases of youthful offenders entitled to sentencing relief under Miller v. Alabama, which outlawed automatic life-without-parole sentences for children.
Thus, some Miller-impacted defendants are being sentenced by paroleboards as executive branch agents, rather than by the judicial branch of
government.
Parole board punishments serve as a somewhat shocking turn of events,
particularly since the right to be sentenced in a courtroom, rather than
some other government-run venue, seems so unquestionable. But quite surprisingly, that right is not contained in the text of the U.S. Constitution. Nor
has the matter been squarely addressed by legal scholars or the Supreme
Court. Instead, both the Court and respected commentators have been writing around the issue for years.
Nevertheless, allowing executive branch bodies to become sole deciders
of penalty terms— up to and including life without parole—is more than
highly unusual. It is deeply problematic as a matter of law, policy, and
precedent. Failing to take action to rein in this emerging practice could
result in serious consequences, not just in Miller matters, but beyond.
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As executive branch agencies, the parole boards have not been called
upon to entirely displace the judicial branch to serve both as front-end penalty adjudicators responsible for proportionality, narrowing, and mitigation assessments, as well as early-release gatekeepers evaluating reform and
risk for reoffending.
In fact, parole-grant determinations are seen as highly informal proceedings, made behind closed doors, without court-level due process protections or even involvement of defense counsel. And the interests, roles, and
experiences of parole agency officials are far different from the legally
trained judiciary who oversee court-based penalty processes. For all these
reasons, permitting parole board displacement of sentencing courts in
Miller matters, or otherwise, is not just inadvisable, but highly injudicious.
This article, therefore, calls for recommitment to the right of court-centered sentencing practices for Miller cases and beyond. It is the first scholarly account of why this is the constitutionally required path in cases
involving the punishment of imprisonment as well as the preferred policy
given contemporary parole board practices and culture.
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I. INTRODUCTION

I

N the United States, criminal defendants, once convicted, will be—
and should be—sentenced in a court of law. At least, this is what
most people believe. This is more than a lofty legal concept or theoretical ideal. It is a truism embedded in the public conscience. From classical literature1 to modern television dramas,2 courtroom sentencing has
been depicted as a well-known feature of the American criminal justice
system.
But this touchstone practice is currently under quiet attack. This is because some states are now allowing parole boards to step in to decide
criminal penalties without first affording defendants lawful judicial
branch sentencing proceedings and sentences. These outside-of-court
punishment decisions are occurring in the cases of youthful offenders entitled to relief under Miller v. Alabama.3

1. See, e.g., HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 232 (J.B. Lippencott Co. ed.,
1960) (describing Jem protesting that “the jury didn’t have to give him death—if they
wanted to they could’ve gave him twenty years”); RICHARD WRIGHT, NATIVE SON 348–49
(1940) (describing Bigger Thomas’s court hearing leading to death sentence).
2. See, e.g., Law and Order: Special Victim’s Unit (NBC television series 1999–present); see also, e.g., American Crime (ABC television series 2015–2017), The Wire (HBO
television series 2002–2008). See generally Samantha Parker, The Portrayal of the American
Legal System in Prime Time Television Crime Dramas, 4 ELON J. UNDERGRADUATE RES.
COMM. 108 (2013) (describing media depiction of courtroom cases and sentencing).
3. 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
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In Miller, the U.S. Supreme Court outlawed automatic juvenile lifewithout-parole sentences, requiring immaturity and youthful characteristics to be considered in a meaningful proceeding before such penalties
could be imposed.4 Moreover, it made clear that a life-without-parole
sentence—the worst that may be imposed upon any child—was to be incredibly rare in this country and allowed only when a young person was
shown to be “irreparabl[y] corrupt[ ].”5
Parole board punishments serve as a somewhat shocking turn of
events, particularly since the right to be sentenced in a courtroom, rather
than some other government-run venue, seems so unquestionable. But
quite surprisingly, that right is not contained in the text of the U.S. Constitution. Nor has the matter been squarely addressed by legal scholars or
the Supreme Court. Instead, both the Court6 and respected commentators7 have been writing around the issue for years.
Nevertheless, allowing executive branch bodies to become sole deciders of penalty terms— up to and including life without parole—is more
than highly unusual. It is deeply problematic as a matter of law, policy,
and precedent. Failing to take action to rein in this emerging practice
could result in serious consequences, not just in Miller matters, but
beyond.
To be sure, parole boards have historically played a limited mercygranting role focused narrowly on the issue of inmate rehabilitation. But
that was on the back end of the punishment process after the sentence
was formally imposed by way of final court judgment. As executive agencies, they have not been called upon to entirely displace the judicial
branch to serve both as front-end penalty adjudicators responsible for
proportionality, narrowing, and mitigation assessments, as well as earlyrelease gatekeepers evaluating reform and risk for reoffending.
In fact, parole-grant determinations are seen as highly informal proceedings, made behind closed doors, without court-level due process protections or even involvement of defense counsel. And the interests, roles,
and experiences of parole agency officials are far different from the le4. See id. at 470.
5. Id. at 479–80.
6. See, e.g., Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018) (discussing usual role and
rights of the district court at sentencing in the context of remanding case for possible sentence reduction, without specifically holding that court must serve as venue for imposition
of sentence in the first instance); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
7. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 989 (2006); William W. Berry III, Individualized Sentencing, 76 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 13 (2019); Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, What’s Wrong with Sentencing
Equality?, 102 VA. L. REV. 1447 (2016); Cara H. Drinan, Misconstruing Graham & Miller,
91 WASH. U. L. REV. 785 (2014); Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional Rights at Sentencing, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 47 (2011); Aaron Rappaport,
The Institutional Design of Punishment, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 913 (2018); see also William W.
Berry III, Discretion without Guidance: The Need to Give Meaning to §3553 After Booker
and its Progeny, 40 CONN. L. REV. 631, 635 (2008) (noting in passing “the United States
Constitution does not specify which branch of government has the responsibility for federal sentencing”).
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gally trained judiciary who oversee court-based penalty processes. For all
these reasons, permitting parole board displacement of sentencing courts
in Miller matters, or otherwise, is not just inadvisable, but highly
injudicious.
This article, therefore, calls for recommitment to the right of courtcentered sentencing practices for Miller cases and beyond. It is the first
scholarly account of why this is the constitutionally required path in cases
involving the punishment of imprisonment as well as the preferred policy
given contemporary parole board practices and culture.
Part II surfaces the dilemma, outlining ongoing efforts across the country to implement Miller, the Supreme Court decision that banned
mandatory life-without-parole prison sentences for juveniles. It describes
how some jurisdictions have opted for administrative reassessment of
penalties for Miller-impacted youthful offenders rather than resentencing
in courts. This is, in part, based upon Supreme Court dicta in the case that
made Miller retroactive, Montgomery v. Louisiana.8 This article uses one
state, Missouri, as a case-study. However, rather than serve as a model,
the Missouri experience demonstrates that state parole board punishments run afoul of constitutional law, reflect poor policy, and provide
troubling precedent for the days ahead.
Indeed, while surveying nearly 200 years of Supreme Court case law,
Part III shows that trial court sentencing is a constitutional cornerstone of
the criminal justice process. It recounts how the Court has developed and
stitched together a robust patchwork of penalty phase protections for
criminal defendants—both procedural and substantive—under individual
provisions of the U.S. Constitution. More than merely establishing a laundry list of rights, however, in creating this blanket of punishment-related
promises, the Court has clearly instantiated the judicial branch as constitutional sentencing norm. Yet, neither this list of protections nor the underlying right to be sentenced in court are being provided in Miller
remedy matters in states that have opted for parole board sentence review processes.
Part IV describes executive branch parole boards in the United States,
beginning with colonial conceptions of clemency and moving through
contemporary correctional agencies. In doing so, it explains the historic
role of executive actors as secondary to the sentencing process, with limited power to exercise mercy on the back end of criminal cases. Moreover, as Part IV further recounts, the federal government and many states
actually abandoned the parole model during the 1980s and 1990s. As a
result, in recent years, there has been even greater emphasis on the primacy of the judicial branch for sentencing purposes.
Part V argues that parole boards today are constitutionally incapable
of serving as sole sentence adjudicators in Miller matters or any other. It
articulates, for the first time, a set of constitutional theories that establish
8. 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016).
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a free-standing fundamental right to be sentenced by a state court. It also
explains how parole systems unquestionably fail to provide each of the
specific procedural constitutional protections required at sentencing for
Miller matters in particular, but in criminal cases generally. Given their
well-documented disorder, political bias, and lack of expertise, parole
boards as entities are also far more likely to violate substantive sentencing rights of defendants. Further, they lack the kind of nuanced knowledge or guidance required to deliver on Miller’s promise of protection
against disproportionality.
Beyond the constitutional problems presented by Miller-based parole
board sentencing, Part VI explains that the practices of such institutions
stand in stark contrast to other important justice system norms in the
United States. It warns that allowing parole board punishments to continue without question in Miller cases potentially paves the way for even
wider use of executive branch administrative sentencing proceedings.
That is, absent adoption of the arguments advanced here, there would be
no reason to stop the spread of parole board penalties to all manner of
matters for purposes of expediency—or possibly worse.
This article thus concludes with a call for recommitment to first-order
fairness for adjudicating criminal punishment. In this era of rash executive branch actions and politically driven calls for vengeance, wholly
agency-based incarceration decisions present serious constitutional issues
and other concerns. It thus urges all states to afford Miller-impacted inmates the right to sentencing hearings in courts of law, if they so desire.
Not only does this respect the constitutional rights of these youthful offenders, but also will protect against parole boards becoming “second
best” sentencing courts in other criminal cases in the future.9
This said, another alternative would be to use the current morass that is
Miller and Montgomery in the United States as an opportunity to establish greater clarity around youthful offender sentences more generally
while ending parole board punishments. Particularly, in light of legislative
enactments contemplating youthful offender reintegration and the rise in
local prosecutorial rethinking about mass incarceration, state stakeholders might finally come together to release all Miller-impacted inmates—
and similarly situated youthful offenders—once they have served somewhere between fifteen to twenty-five years of incarceration. Such a
lengthy prison term reflects an emerging consensus of what constitutes a
sufficient sanction for youthful transgressions, even in the case of causing
death. Such release would help avoid wasting further time, energy, and
words while attempting to grapple with the riddle of what life means for
youth.

9. See generally William Ortman, Second-Best Criminal Justice, 96 WASH. U. L. REV.
1061 (2019).
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II. EMERGING PROBLEM OF STATE PAROLE
BOARD PUNISHMENTS
A. MILLER V. ALABAMA
Beginning in 2005, the Supreme Court handed down a series of decisions establishing that youth are different from adults for purposes of sentencing.10 Drawing on biological and social science developments—as
well as past precedent and the common sense experiences of parents—
the Court explained that adolescent brains are different from those of
fully grown defendants.11 As a result, youth are now considered categorically less culpable than adults in criminal matters.12 Youth do not fully
appreciate risks, are more susceptible to negative influences and pressures, and do not understand the consequences of their actions in the
same way as adults.13 They also are more amenable to rehabilitation since
they are likely to change over time and grow out of their immaturity and
risk-seeking conduct.14 Relying on these findings, the Court substantively
restricted juvenile sentences in a range of ways.
In 2005, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court struck down capital punishment for children.15 The Court held that their still evolving moral compasses and transitory traits made youth “categorically less culpable” than
adults, requiring states to exempt them from the country’s most serious
criminal sanction available for adults: the death penalty.16
In 2010, in Graham v. Florida, the Court created another sentencing
ban for youth, holding that children who do not intentionally kill cannot
be sentenced to a prison term of life without parole.17 The Court noted
that a life-without-parole sentence, “the second most severe penalty permitted by law,” was the most serious punishment a child could face.18
Thus, “likening life-without-parole sentences imposed on juveniles to the
10. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (noting that children are categorically different from adults
for purpose of sentencing); see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); Mae C. Quinn, Introduction: Evolving Standards in
Juvenile Justice from Gault to Graham and Beyond, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 12–13
(2012) [hereinafter Quinn, Evolving Standards] (describing the Court’s evolving standards
of decency doctrine for youth as “a story still very much in progress”).
11. See generally Kristin Henning, Juvenile Justice After Graham v. Florida: Keeping
Due Process, Autonomy, and Paternalism in Balance, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 17, 23–25
(2012); Perry L. Moriearty, The Trilogy and Beyond, 62 S.D. L. REV. 539, 545–46 (2017).
12. See Mae C. Quinn, In Loco Juvenile Justice: Minors in Munis, Cash from Kids, and
Adolescent Pro Se Advocacy—Ferguson and Beyond, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1247, 1299–302
(2015) [hereinafter Quinn, In Loco Juvenile Justice] (suggesting expansion of the “categorically less culpable” doctrine beyond sentencing proceedings for youth).
13. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 490 (Breyer, J., concurring); Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Roper,
543 U.S. at 569–70. See generally Quinn, In Loco Juvenile Justice, supra note 12, at 1262.
14. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 472, 477 (majority opinion); Graham, 560 U.S. at 72–74;
Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
15. Roper, 543 U.S at 568; see Quinn, Evolving Standards, supra note 10, at 12.
16. Roper, 543 U.S. at 567–70 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002));
see Quinn, Evolving Standards, supra note 10, at 12.
17. Graham, 560 U.S. at 82; see also Henning, supra note 11, at 17.
18. Graham, 560 U.S. at 69 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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death penalty itself,” the Court in Graham applied heightened proportionality analysis to categorically narrow the universe of youth who could
potentially receive death-behind-bars sentences.19
In 2012, the Court decided Miller v. Alabama, which struck down
mandatory life-without-parole prison terms for young people—even
those who intentionally kill.20 It reiterated that only “the rare juvenile
offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption,” rather than “transient immaturity,” should be eligible for life without parole.21 It explained
that it “viewed this ultimate penalty for juveniles as akin to the death
penalty,” as for them it was the “most severe punishment” available
under law.22 A careful narrowing and proportionality process would be
needed, as in death penalty cases, to demonstrate the harshest available
sentence could be imposed.23
Miller also made clear that a child’s circumstances, including mitigating
factors relating to youth, had to be considered and evaluated in an individualized sentencing process.24 This would need to occur before a child
defendant could be deemed beyond reach such that “irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison” was appropriate.25 Accordingly, it reversed the state court judgment that upheld Miller’s sentence.26 It did the
same for Kuntrell Jackson, the defendant in the companion case to
Miller.27 Both defendants were remanded for new sentencing hearings in
their respective state trial courts.28
B. MONTGOMERY V. LOUISIANA
As other commentators have previously catalogued, states that had automatic juvenile-life-without-parole sentences on their books responded
to Miller in a range of ways,29 with many first resisting30 before attempt19. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 474–75 (describing the holding in Graham); see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 48, 75, 82.
20. See id. at 489.
21. Id. at 479–80.
22. Id. at 475.
23. See generally id. at 479–80.
24. Id. at 476.
25. Id. at 480.
26. See id. at 489.
27. Id.
28. Matt Smith, Evan Miller Offers Apology as Resentencing Hearing Wraps, JUV.
JUST. INFO. EXCHANGE (Mar. 15, 2017), http://jjie.org/2017/03/15/brain-science-prisonstaff-warden-take-stand-in-evan-miller-resentencing-trial [https://perma.cc/G6AA-5W7L];
see also Associated Press, Arkansas Court to Hear Case on Past Juvenile Life Sentences,
KUAR ONLINE (Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.ualrpublicradio.org/post/arkansas-court-hearcase-past-juvenile-life-sentences [https://perma.cc/CB7L-JFDU].
29. See generally Beth Caldwell, Creating Meaningful Opportunities for Release: Graham, Miller and California’s Youth Offender Parole Hearings, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 245 (2016) [hereinafter Caldwell, Creating Meaningful Opportunities for Release];
Moriearty, supra note 11.
30. See Joshua Rovner, Slow to Act: State Responses to 2012 Supreme Court Mandate
on Life Without Parole, SENT’G PROJECT (June 25, 2014), https://www.sentencingproject
.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Slow-to-Act-State-Responses-to-Miller.pdf [https://perma
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ing to bring sentencing codes into compliance for future cases.31 As for
past cases where automatic death-behind-bars prison terms were already
imposed, responses also varied.32 Some jurisdictions quickly held that
Miller-impacted inmates needed to be remanded to trial courts for constitutional resentencing, as it occurred in the cases of Miller and Jackson.33
Others held that Miller should not be applied retroactively to past cases
because Miller was a procedural decision under Teague v. Lane and did
not announce a new substantive criminal law rule.34 A third group of
states, including Missouri, declined to act until the Supreme Court took
action to address the question of Miller’s retrospective application.35
Finally, in 2016, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Court held Miller applied retroactively to the over 2,000 youth incarcerated under mandatory
life-without-parole judgments and orders.36 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy addressed the main substantive issue before the Court:
The Court now holds that Miller announced a substantive rule of
constitutional law. The conclusion that Miller states a substantive
rule comports with the principles that informed Teague. . . . Miller’s
conclusion that the sentence of life without parole is disproportionate for the vast majority of juvenile offenders raises a grave risk that
many are being held in violation of the Constitution.37
The Court posited that, “[a]fter Miller, it will be the rare juvenile offender who can receive that same sentence.”38
Justice Kennedy also clarified that Miller also impacted sentencing procedures.39 Specifically, it demanded a specialized approach to individualization to protect against disproportionality in the cases of juvenile
offenders:
To be sure, Miller’s holding has a procedural component. Miller requires a sentencer to consider a juvenile offender’s youth and attendant characteristics before determining that life without parole is a
.cc/9KH4-DM4Y]; see also Robert S. Chang et al., Evading Miller, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
85 (2015).
31. See Drinan, supra note 7, at 787–89; Sarah French Russell & Tracy L. Denholtz,
Procedures for Proportionate Sentences: The Next Wave of Eighth Amendment Noncapital
Litigation, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1121, 1137–39 (2016).
32. See French Russell & Denholtz, supra note 31, at 1137–38.
33. See, e.g., Chang et al., supra note 30, at 92–93; see also People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d
709, 723 (Ill. 2014) (“We remand for a new sentencing hearing, where the trial court may
consider all permissible sentences.”).
34. See generally Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); Rovner, supra note 30.
35. See Missouri’s Failure to Act on Juvenile Life Terms Could Have Expensive Consequences, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 25, 2015), https://www.stltoday.com/opinion/editorial/editorial-missouri-s-failure-to-act-on-juvenile-life-terms/article_8d37b239-a575-5291a49a-54b7ab4ae575.html [https://perma.cc/9XSS-PWDA].
36. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732–36 (2016).
37. Id. at 736.
38. Id. at 734.
39. See id. at 732–36 (clarifying that Miller both imposed procedural requirements for
individualized sentencing and “announced a substantive rule of constitutional law”). See
generally Beth Caldwell, Miller v. Alabama as a Watershed Procedural Rule: The Case for
Retroactivity, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. S1 (2016).
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proportionate sentence. . . . The procedure Miller prescribes is . . . .
[a] hearing where “youth and its attendant characteristics” are considered as sentencing factors [and] is necessary to separate those
juveniles who may be sentenced to life without parole from those
who may not. The hearing does not replace but rather gives effect to
Miller’s substantive holding that life without parole is an excessive
sentence for children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity.40
Thus, youth previously given mandatory life-without-parole sentences
were entitled to relief.41 And defendant Montgomery, like Miller and
Jackson, had his case remanded and was provided with a resentencing
hearing in state court.42
The question of remedy for the other Miller-impacted inmates was not
before the Court. Yet Justice Kennedy offered a highly unusual suggestion for them. He opined it was possible that not all would need to return
to court for resentencing.43 He instead offered:
Giving Miller retroactive effect . . . does not require States to relitigate sentences, let alone convictions, in every case where a juvenile
offender received mandatory life without parole. A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to
be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.44
Relying on the Wyoming post-Miller youthful-offender-parole statute
as the Court’s only authority, Justice Kennedy continued: “Allowing
those offenders to be considered for parole ensures that juveniles whose
crimes reflected only transient immaturity—and who have since matured—will not be forced to serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment.”45
But such dicta reached beyond the retroactivity issue presented to the
Court. It reflects a highly unusual turn in law and has been read to propose a deeply problematic practice: permitting a state executive branch
agency to decide in the first instance the appropriate prison sentence in
an individual case.46 Moreover, as further discussed below, such a course
of action fails to ensure Justice Kennedy’s earlier command—a meaningful process to guarantee youth are very rarely incarcerated for their
lifetime.
Indeed, most states with Miller-impacted inmates in need of relief did
40. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734–35 (internal citations omitted).
41. See id. at 736–37.
42. See id.; Jody Kent Lavy, Montgomery v. Louisiana: America’s Racist History
Means Even a Supreme Court Victory Does Not Guarantee Justice, NEWSWEEK (May 29,
2019), http://newsweek.com/montgomery-louisiana-americas-racist-history-supreme-courtopinion-1437465 [https://perma.cc/U4HC-2S6S] (describing Montgomery’s resentencing in
court, resulting in a parole eligible sentence).
43. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736.
44. Id. (citing WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6–10–301(c) (2013) (juvenile homicide offenders
eligible for parole after 25 years)).
45. Id.
46. See id.
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not embrace this approach47—including Wyoming. The 2013 Wyoming
provision cited by Justice Kennedy was not expressly retroactive.48
Rather, in 2018, Wyoming’s high court sent a Miller-related case to the
trial court for resentencing and declined to apply its parole statutes retrospectively or follow the parole path proposed by Justice Kennedy.49
A few states have adopted this unorthodox practice. In those jurisdictions, impacted defendants are placed before executive branch agencies
for non-judicial actors to decide whether life without parole is the appropriate punishment for them. And they are doing so, as further discussed
below, without regard for any particular sentencing scheme or judicial
understanding of constitutional law. Nor are they required to conduct
themselves like a court of law.50 Missouri is one of the jurisdictions that
has adopted this approach.51
C. PUNTING

TO

PAROLE BOARDS—A CASE STUDY

After Miller was decided, a collective of attorneys and law students
litigated throughout the courts of Missouri on behalf of the nearly 100
Miller-impacted inmates in that state. They also appeared several times
before the legislature to try to bring the state’s criminal code into constitutional compliance.52 Both branches of government avoided the issue
47. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 547 S.W.3d 64, 70–71 (Ark. 2018) (acknowledging Montgomery’s dicta, declining to directly send Miller-impacted youthful offender to parole
board for review, and instead ordering court resentencing); see also Stevens v. State, 422
P.3d 741, 750 (Okla. Crim. App. 2018) (where state seeks to expose juvenile murderer to
life without parole, it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt at a jury sentencing that the
defendant is “irreparably corrupt”); Kimberly Thomas, Random If Not “Rare”? The Eighth
Amendment Weaknesses of Post-Miller Legislation, 68 S.C. L. REV. 393, 403 (2017) (“Of
the states that have passed legislation that still permits life without parole, by far the most
common approach has been to change the sentencing hearing itself, instead of, for example, the parole board process.”).
48. Joshua Wolfson, Juvenile Killer Law Won’t Change 8 Sentences, CASPER STAR
TRIB., Feb. 25, 2013, at A1, A10.
49. See Davis v. State, 415 P.3d 666, 677 (Wyo. 2018) (at request of both prosecution
and defense, expressly declining to accept Justice Kennedy’s proposed “solution” of sending juvenile life without parole matter to the parole board for review before allowing for
resentencing hearing in court).
50. ASS’N OF PAROLING AUTHS. INT’L & NAT’L INST. OF CORR., A HANDBOOK FOR
NEW PAROLE BOARD MEMBERS 25 (Peggy Burke ed., 2003) [hereinafter A HANDBOOK
FOR NEW PAROLE BOARD MEMBERS] (noting that “[t]he paroling authority is an executive
branch agency” and that most state parole board members are appointed by and/or report
to the governor).
51. See Associated Press, A State-by-State Look at Juvenile Life Without Parole, SEATTLE TIMES (July 30, 2017), https://seattletimes.com/nation-world/a-state-by-state-look-atjuvenile-life-without-parole/ [https://perma.cc/98JA-4QXR] [hereinafter A State-by-State
Look at Juvenile Life Without Parole]. Although each has taken a somewhat slightly different approach to the issue, as further discussed below, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Nevada are among the other states that are using parole board review proceedings. Id.
52. This state-wide collective was organized, in part, by this author during her tenure
as Director of the Juvenile Rights and Re-Entry Project and Professor of Law at Washington University at St. Louis. The collective included over 100 attorneys; law students; mitigation support experts, other law school faculty members such as Sean O’Brien and
Kathryn Pierce; public defenders organized under the leadership of Melinda Pendergraph;
private attorneys such as Elizabeth Carlyle and Kent Gipson; Amy Breihan and Jim
Wyrsch as pro bono counsel at Bryan Cave; and Matt Knepper, Denyse Jones, and Sarah
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over the course of many years until the Supreme Court decided Montgomery.53 Once Montgomery was handed down, Miller-impacted inmates
in Missouri—including a youthful offender by the name of Norman
Brown—filed further emergency applications with the state’s supreme
court, urging immediate remand for trial court resentencing.54
During the 1990s, Norman Brown had been lured by an older father
figure, nearly twice his age, to accompany him during a jewelry store theft
in the St. Louis area.55 Tragically, the theft resulted in the shooting death
of the store’s owner at the hands of the armed adult codefendant.56 Yet
Brown, an unarmed, non-trigger man—only fifteen years old at the time
of the crime—received a mandatory life-without-parole prison term
based upon an accessorial liability theory for murder in the first degree, a
Class A felony.57 Brown and the other Missouri Miller-impacted inmates
argued that, as a result of Montgomery, Missouri’s mandatory life-without-parole language needed to be struck from the criminal code when
applied to their cases.58 Further, they sought trial court resentencing
under Missouri’s remaining lawful sentencing provisions for Class A felonies, which provided for determinate terms of between ten to thirty years’
incarceration or, if appropriate given the circumstances, a life sentence
with parole eligibility.59
The Missouri Attorney General’s Office did not oppose petitioners’ apZimmerman and other pro bono counsel at Husch Blackwell. In collaboration with Bryan
Stevenson’s Equal Justice Initiative, Marcia Levick’s Juvenile Law Center, and other national youth-justice organizations, the collective advocated on behalf of Missouri’s approximately 100 Miller-impacted clients over several years. Post-Montgomery, this author left
academia for a period of time to serve as founding Director of the MacArthur Justice
Center at St. Louis, which further litigated on behalf of Missouri’s Miller-impacted youthful offenders.
53. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Mann, Juvenile Life Terms Still Up in the Air After Court Case,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 18, 2015), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-andcourts/juvenile-life-terms-still-up-in-air-after-court-case/article_661f1662-6246-55f6-b025beba9a87dc1e.html [https://perma.cc/YK8X-XXUZ].
54. See, e.g., Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment & Issuance of Writ of Habeas
Corpus at 1, Brown v. Bowersox, No. SC 93094 (Mo. Feb. 4, 2016).
55. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at ¶ 128, Brown
v. Precythe, No. 2:17-cv-04082-NKL (W.D. Mo. Nov. 1, 2017).
56. Id. at ¶ 129.
57. Id. at ¶ 128. Brown’s story, including further features of his sentence, has garnered
national attention. See, e.g., Katie Rose Quandt, The False Hope of Parole, OUTLINE (Mar.
8, 2018), https://theoutline.com/post/3625/the-false-hope-of-parole?zd=1&zi=mclg6cf7
[https://perma.cc/ZTU4-T3EA]. The decedent’s wife, also present during this terrible criminal episode, was a victim too.
58. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 55, at
¶ 128.
59. See, e.g., Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment & Issuance of Writ of Habeas
Corpus, supra note 54, at 2 (describing how Missouri law provides for striking language
deemed unlawful and reading the remaining provisions along with any other existing laws);
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 7–9, Lotts v. Wallace, No. SC 92831 (Mo. Sept. 7,
2012) (same arguments as above, first advanced by attorneys from the Equal Justice Initiative); see also MO. REV. STAT. § 565.020(2) (1993) (“Murder in the first degree is a class A
felony, and the punishment shall be either death or imprisonment for life without eligibility
for probation or parole . . . .”); MO. REV. STAT. § 558.011(1)(1) (1993) (“For a class A
felony, a term of years not less than ten years and not to exceed thirty years, or life
imprisonment . . . .”).
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plications for immediate resentencing under Montgomery.60 Yet, the Missouri Supreme Court denied the requests.61 Instead, it held that all
Miller-impacted youthful offenders could apply to the Missouri Department of Probation and Parole to seek review of their existing mandatory
life-without-parole sentences after serving twenty-five years.62 It did not
strike any existing judgment or sentence orders nor were matters sent
back to trial courts for new sentencing proceedings. Moreover, in its individual orders on the post-Miller habeas corpus applications, the Court
extended a strange invitation to the Missouri Governor or Legislature to
weigh in on the situation.63
The Missouri Legislature accepted the Missouri Supreme Court’s suggestion and hastily passed Senate Bill 590, which was signed into law by
Governor Jay Nixon.64 Senate Bill 590 endorsed the framework of an administrative body—the Missouri Department of Probation and Parole—
reviewing the existing mandatory life-without-parole sentences of Millerimpacted youthful offenders after they served twenty-five years.65 On its
own motion, the Missouri Supreme Court then withdrew its prior orders
in all individual Miller matters, declaring the habeas requests now moot.66
Missouri’s Miller-impacted inmates were therefore left serving unconstitutional mandatory life-without-parole prison terms—unless and until the
state’s parole board, as sole adjudicator, decided otherwise.
These unprecedented actions were challenged in state and federal proceedings on constitutional and other grounds.67 For instance, the Miller
defendants asserted ex post facto claims given the new bill’s attempt to
override existing sentencing laws.68 They further pointed out that the bill
improperly delegated legislative power to parole officials who were left
60. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 6, Lotts v. Steele, No. SC 97025
(Mo. Mar. 13, 2018) (describing how “[t]he State did not file any opposition” to the motions for Summary Judgment filed by Missouri’s Miller-impacted youthful offenders following the decision in Montgomery).
61. See, e.g., Order at 2, Brown v. Bowersox, No. SC 93094 (Mo. Mar. 15, 2016).
62. Id.
63. Id. (“[P]etitioner shall be eligible to apply for parole after serving 25 years’ imprisonment on his sentence of life without parole unless his sentence is otherwise brought into
conformity with Miller and Montgomery by action of the governor or enactment of necessary legislation.”).
64. See Kurt Erickson, Future Unclear for Juvenile Murder Sentencing Changes, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-andpolitics/future-unclear-for-juvenile-murder-sentencing-changes/article_23f348dc-611d-589fb7fc-407d3d2cf82b.html [https://perma.cc/TYP6-9WXG] (reporting on hurried efforts to
enact Missouri Senate Bill 590).
65. See S.B. 590, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016) (codified at MO. REV.
STAT. §§ 558.047, 565.033).
66. See, e.g., Order at 3, supra note 61 (“On the Court’s own motion, the Court’s
March 15, 2016, order is vacated. The motion for rehearing is overruled as moot. The petition is denied. See Senate Bill No. 590 . . . .”).
67. See, e.g., Petitioner’s Supplement to Motion for Rehearing at 2, Brown v. Bowersox, No. SC 93094 (Mo. May 20, 2016) (urging Missouri Supreme Court to remedy the
further “confusion and unconstitutionality” created by the passage of Senate Bill 590).
68. See id. See generally Paul D. Reingold & Kimberly Thomas, Wrong Turn on the Ex
Post Facto Clause, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 593 (2018) (describing certain parole board actions
as violative of ex post facto provisions).
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without any real term-of-year guidelines or legal standards for sentencing
review.69
Beyond all of this, and most significantly for purposes of this article,
Missouri’s Miller-impacted inmates argued that executive branch parole
board decision-making could not entirely displace constitutionally rooted
judicial branch sentencing processes—in other words, that they were constitutionally entitled to be sentenced in a court of law.70 But this application was denied too.71 And a small minority of states around the
country—including Connecticut, Massachusetts, Nevada, and West Virginia—have adopted similar parole board sentence review procedures.72
The remainder of this article will explore why this practice—allowing
contemporary parole boards to single-handedly decide correct terms of
imprisonment—is constitutionally problematic in Miller resentencing
cases. It thus urges a rethinking of this process to allow courtroom sentencing assessments in Miller remedy cases, when requested. Such
changes are also needed to prevent other potentially negative consequences as a result of this shift, including deployment of executive branch
punishment procedures in other kinds of criminal cases.
III. CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATE COURT
SENTENCING RIGHTS73
Neither the Constitution’s express language nor the case law interpreting it reference a right to be sentenced in a court of law. Even the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, entitled “Further Guaran69. See Reingold & Thomas, supra note 68 and accompanying text.
70. As inaugural Director of the MacArthur Justice Center, this author advanced
these arguments in Brown v. Bowersox, No. SC 93094 (Mo. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
637 (2017). The Juvenile Law Center joined this application as amicus. See Legal Docket:
Brown v. Bowersox, JUV. L. CTR. (Nov. 17, 2016), https://jlc.org/cases/brown-v-bowersox
[https://perma.cc/U89Q-8JKB]; see also Polk v. Lewis, No. SC 96917, 2018 Mo. LEXIS 268
(Mo. July 3, 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 466 (2018) (advancing similar arguments relating
to the right to sentencing before a court); Order at 1, Lotts v. Steele, No. SC 97025 (Mo.
July 3, 2018) (denying petition for habeas corpus of Equal Justice Initiative, arguing Senate
Bill 590, as implemented, denied petitioner his constitutional right to an adversarial sentencing process within a court of law).
71. See Sharon Cohen & Adam Geller, After 2016 Ruling, Battles Over Juvenile Lifer
Cases Persist, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 20, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/422236ad63c6
4636a2e9f3622abed55d [https://perma.cc/HZT2-JPNZ].
72. A State-by-State Look at Juvenile Life Without Parole, supra note 51; see also, e.g.,
State v. Williams-Bey, 144 A.3d 467, 470, 475 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016); Commonwealth v.
Brown, 1 N.E.3d 259, 261 n.4 (Mass. 2013); Michael Erb, W.Va. Law Change to Give Seven
Lifers Parole Shot, W. VA. PRESS (Aug. 14, 2014), https://wvpress.org/copydesk/insight/wva-law-change-give-seven-lifers-parole-shot/ [https://perma.cc/8REQ-3VF6]; Stephen T.
Watson, Teen Who Murdered a Kenmore Native in 1998 Is up for a Pardon. His Victim’s
Loved Ones Are Outraged, BUFFALO NEWS (June 15, 2019), https://buffalonews.com/2019/
06/15/teen-who-murdered-a-kenmore-native-in-1998-is-up-for-a-pardon-his-victims-lovedones-are-outraged/ [https://perma.cc/J8HP-ZZ5H] (describing Nevada’s process for seeking release following mandatory juvenile life without parole sentence—application to the
Pardon Board).
73. For more on the concept of “constitutionalization” of state criminal processes, see
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 295 (1993).
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tees in Criminal Cases” is silent on the issue.74 Yet for generations, Supreme Court decisions have been written as if this is the case. This has
been so in federal and state matters dating back to the 1800s, and the
practice continued throughout the twentieth century as the Court developed its doctrines relating to constitutional sentencing rights and into the
present day.
A. EARLY SUPREME COURT SENTENCING CASES
In 1830, a defendant challenged the legality of his imprisonment for
allegedly defrauding the federal government in Ex Parte Watkins.75 This
case serves as an early example of the Court’s understanding of the centrality of the judicial branch to sentencing. Specifically, the Court held
that it was without power to look behind the sentence judgment.76 Instead, it explained:
If the offence be punishable by law, that court is competent to inflict
the punishment. The judgment of such a tribunal has all the obligation which the judgment of any tribunal can have. To determine
whether the offence charged in the indictment be legally punishable
or not is among the most unquestionable of its powers and duties.77
That is, since the defendant was sentenced by a court of law with jurisdiction, the process and related imprisonment was not wrongful or illegal.78 This commitment to judicial-branch-responsibility-for-sentence
imposition continued into the 1900s.79 For instance, in 1916, the prosecution successfully challenged a trial court’s refusal to impose a sentence as
required by statute in Ex Parte United States.80 There the Court noted,
Indisputably under our constitutional system the right to try offenses
against the criminal laws, and, upon conviction, to impose the punishment provided by law, is judicial, and it is equally to be conceded
that, in exerting the powers vested in them on such subject, courts
inherently possess ample right to exercise reasonable, that is, judicial, discretion to enable them to wisely exert their authority.81
This narrative of the judicial branch as locus for sentencing was
strengthened as the Court announced specific procedural and substantive
constitutional rights for state court sentencings under the Incorporation
74. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
75. 28 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193, 195–96 (1830).
76. See id. at 209.
77. Id. at 203.
78. See id. at 209; see also Ex Parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18, 23 (1876) (relying on Watkins to
further uphold the “unquestionable” powers of the court system to punish).
79. See, e.g., Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 627 (1912) (reiterating the role of
the judge, not the prison warden, in ensuring correct and individualized sentence); Dimmick v. Tompkins, 194 U.S. 540, 549 (1904) (surveying with approval the court-based sentencing practices across states including Illinois, Indiana, North Carolina, and
Massachusetts).
80. 242 U.S. 27, 41–42 (1916).
81. Id.
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Doctrine. Still, the Court has never formally declared a fundamental constitutional right to sentencing by a court of law.
B. DEVELOPMENT

OF

PROCEDURAL SENTENCING PROTECTIONS

Rather, procedural sentencing rights have emerged over time in the
United States by way of individual Supreme Court cases. As described
below, a patchwork of penalty-phase protections has resulted with recognized rights stitched together by the Court one by one. Taken as a whole,
these cases blanket the penalty phase to instantiate court as a constitutional setting. Thus, even if the Court has not explicitly held these rights
and protections must be delivered by a court of law—rather than some
other government venue—it is clearly assumed. However, many Millerimpacted inmates are not receiving a lawful court-based sentencing process, or the individual procedural protections outlined below.
1. Due Process and Individualization
Well before the Supreme Court began incorporating specific Bill of
Rights protections into state criminal proceedings, it acknowledged that
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause created a floor below
which local governments could not fall.82 For instance, in Williams v. New
York, the “leading ruling on the content of due process as it applies to
procedures in traditional discretionary sentencing,”83 the Court acknowledged the need for certain protections during sentencing proceedings.84
In Williams, the trial court discounted the jury’s life sentence recommendation and instead ordered execution based, at least in part, upon
hearsay evidence in a presentence report.85 The Court, noting the defendant never sought to contest the claims nor argued they were factually
incorrect, found there was no due process violation.86 However, even as it
did so, the Court reiterated its expectation that state punishment proceedings would be handled by the judicial branch, describing the “grave
responsibility of fixing sentence[s]” as one belonging to the courts.87
Nearly thirty years later in Gardner v. Florida, another case raising
concerns about a pre-sentence report, the Court vacated a death sentence
imposed in violation of due process.88 Unlike Williams, the defendant in
Gardner did not have access to all of the information considered at sen82. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536–37 (1968) (describing the benefit of “fruitful
experimentation” across states in the field of criminal justice).
83. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1253 (5th ed. 2009).
84. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 251 (1949).
85. Id. at 244.
86. Id. at 252; see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 83, at 1253 (noting Williams was
“decided at a time when the process of capital sentencing was not much different than the
sentencing procedure typically followed in non-capital cases”).
87. Williams, 377 U.S. at 251.
88. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 404–05 (1977). Although there was no majority opinion in Gardner, three Justices signed a decision to reverse and remand for “further
proceedings at the trial court not inconsistent with this opinion.” Id. at 405.
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tencing.89 Instead, the judge reviewed information in a pre-sentence report marked “confidential” and kept it from the defendant and his
attorney.90 In reaching its decision, not only did the plurality distinguish
Gardner from Williams on its facts, but it ultimately embraced the “death
is different” framework for Eighth Amendment cases that, as discussed,
has since been expanded to juvenile sentencing matters.91 It therefore
held some level of heightened due process protection was necessary to
avoid arbitrary outcomes in cases involving the most serious sentence
available.92 Again, judicial branch sentencing was implied as the norm in
this decision for both death and non-death matters.
The Court has also expressly required basic due process protections in
non-capital sentencing proceedings. In 1948, in Townsend v. Burke, the
Court held the state court sentencing process lacked fundamental fairness.93 Townsend was subjected to a hurried guilty plea without access to
counsel and then was quickly sentenced.94 During the in-court sentencing
colloquy, the trial judge relied on the defendant’s alleged past conviction
record—ignoring the fact that some information presented was simply incorrect and related to another defendant.95
Townsend based his subsequent Supreme Court challenge on the right
to counsel.96 However, the Court did not go so far as to find that the
Sixth Amendment applied to state criminal sentencing proceedings—
something that happened decades later.97 Instead it found that “while disadvantaged by lack of counsel, this prisoner was sentenced on the basis of
assumptions concerning his criminal record which were materially untrue.
Such a result, whether caused by carelessness or design, is inconsistent
with due process of law, and such a conviction cannot stand.”98 This
serves as one of the Court’s first articulations of the constitutional right to
an individualized sentencing determination based upon specific characteristics of the defendant and facts of his case. Due process individualization has been considered in many cases since.99
89. Id. at 351.
90. Id. at 353.
91. Id. at 357–58 (“[F]ive Members of the Court have now expressly recognized that
death is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed in this
country.”); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256 (1972) (per curiam) (striking
down Georgia and Texas death penalty statutes under the Eighth Amendment because
they were not “evenhanded, nonselective, and nonarbitrary” in determining who should be
executed).
92. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 358; see also, e.g., Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 124–25
(1991).
93. See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 737–740 (1948).
94. Id. at 737–39.
95. Id. at 737, 739–40 (addressing the imposition of “two indeterminate sentences, not
exceeding 10 to 20 years”).
96. Id. at 738–41.
97. See infra notes 100–104 and accompanying text.
98. Townsend, 334 U.S. at 740–41.
99. See, e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 452 (1962); Keenan v. Burke, 342 U.S. 881,
881 (1951) (per curiam); see also Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2560 (2015)
(“Invoking so shapeless a provision to condemn someone to prison for 15 years to life does
not comport with the Constitution’s guarantee of due process.”).
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In all these cases—both capital and non-capital—by repeatedly referencing the role played by trial courts in deciding appropriate punishments, the Court also advanced the expectation that sentences would be
imposed by the judicial branch of government. Over time, the Court has
expanded the list of rights afforded at sentencing by way of the incorporation doctrine. Here too, the Court’s language and discussions assume
sentencing in a courtroom.
2. Critical Stage and Right to Counsel
Starting with Mempa v. Rhay in 1967, the Supreme Court held defendants have the right to counsel in state prosecutions at both trial and sentencing.100 Using the Fourteenth Amendment as a bridge to the Sixth
Amendment,101 the Court declared that the post-trial punishment phase
is a “critical stage” of the criminal process where an accused facing incarceration must be afforded the “effective assistance of counsel” if requested.102 The Court went on: “[T]he necessity for the aid of counsel in
marshaling the facts, introducing evidence of mitigating circumstances
and in general aiding and assisting the defendant to present his case as to
sentence is apparent.”103 In this way, criminal defendants in state-level
sentencing cases are now entitled to the same right of court-appointed
counsel as those involved in Article III federal court punishment
proceedings.104
Mempa involved two Washington state probation revocation matters.105 Petitioners pleaded guilty and were placed on probation with imprisonment deferred.106 However, because of alleged violations, they
were brought before the court without counsel and had their deferred
term-of-years sentences summarily imposed.107 The probation revocation
and sentencing occurred in a court of law and was not administratively
determined or imposed by Washington’s executive branch probation
agency.108 Moreover, when the Court later held that Mempa established a
retroactive rule, it remanded similar matters so that the defendants in
those cases could avail themselves of resentencing proceedings in a court
100. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967).
101. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–44 (1963) (extending for the first
time Sixth Amendment protections, which previously applied only to federal prosecutions,
to state criminal trials by way of Fourteenth Amendment incorporation doctrine). See generally Mae C. Quinn, Giving Kids Their Due: Theorizing a Modern Fourteenth Framework
for Juvenile Defense Representation, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2185 (2014) [hereinafter Quinn, Giving Kids Their Due].
102. Quinn, Giving Kids Their Due, supra note 101, at 2199.
103. Mempa, 389 U.S. at 135.
104. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972); see also
Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 80–81 (2004) (“The Sixth Amendment safeguards to an accused
who faces incarceration the right to counsel at all critical stages of the criminal process.”);
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979).
105. See Mempa, 389 U.S. at 136–37.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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with the assistance of counsel.109
In the Gardner death penalty case described above, which the Court
took up a decade after Mempa, it not only demanded due process fairness
but also reaffirmed its commitment to representation rights during sentencing.110 Since portions of the presentence report had been withheld
from defense counsel, the Court remanded the matter with specific instructions to hold a resentencing hearing where counsel would be allowed
to more meaningfully advocate for his client.111 The Court specifically
rejected the possibility of allowing Gardner’s original death judgment to
stand and have the state appellate court merely review the sentence.112
During the 1980s, the Court was asked to evaluate representational effectiveness under the Sixth Amendment in the context of a capital murder matter, Strickland v. Washington.113 The Court reinstated a death
sentence at the request of the state, finding the record failed to demonstrate deficient attorney performance impacting the outcome of the proceedings.114 Although the accused did not prevail, the Court noted the
constitutional significance of the sentencing process, particularly where a
defendant faced the most serious penalty allowed by law.115 Specifically,
the capital sentencing process was “like a trial in its adversarial format
and . . . that counsel’s role in the proceeding is comparable to counsel’s
role at trial—to ensure that the adversarial testing process works to produce a just result . . . .”116 Thus it drew a clear picture of capital sentencing occurring only under the auspices of the judicial branch.
In the non-capital context, the threshold for ineffective representation
for sentencing is not as clear.117 Yet, no Sixth Amendment sentencing
decision has ever suggested that incarceration might be imposed outside
of the judicial setting. Rather, just as in-court “debate between adversaries is often essential to the truth-seeking function of trials,” in all cases
meaningful representation should include “giving counsel an opportunity
to comment on facts which may influence the sentencing decision.”118
3. Jury Determinations
The Supreme Court has not imposed an absolute right to jury findings
beyond a reasonable doubt at all state sentence proceedings, even where
109. See McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2, 3–4 (1968).
110. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357–58 (1977).
111. See id. at 362.
112. Id.
113. See 466 U.S. 668, 671 (1984).
114. Id. at 700–01.
115. See id. at 685–87.
116. Id.; see also John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at
Capital Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1967, 1987 (2005) (noting the Court “took pains to
link the world of capital sentencing to the world of trial”); Emily Hughes, Mitigating Death,
18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 337, 352–57 (2009) (describing features of effective assistance of counsel for death-eligible cases).
117. See generally Carissa Byrne Hessick, Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing, 50 B.C. L.
REV. 1069 (2009).
118. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 360 (1977).
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there is a right to jury trial.119 However, in both state and federal matters,
capital and non-capital, the Court has guaranteed a right to jury determination for facts or aggravating circumstances that enhance a jail or prison
sentence beyond that ordinarily contemplated by controlling law. For instance, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court granted relief after a sentencing judge—and not a jury—made findings of fact that exposed the
defendant to a sentence higher than the statutory maximum.120 In addition, the Court held that such sentence enhancement findings—as with
any element of a crime—must be proven by the prosecution beyond a
reasonable doubt.121 This differentiates enhancement cases from run-ofthe-mill criminal matters where a preponderance standard for contested
sentencing facts is sufficient.122
In Ring v. Arizona, the Court further explained that under the Sixth
Amendment, a jury—and not a judge—must decide beyond a reasonable
doubt whether aggravating factors exist that make a murder case eligible
for a death sentence.123 In doing so, the Court invalidated death penalty
statutes and sentencing practices in several states.124 More recently, in
Hurst v. Florida, decided the same year as Montgomery, the Court struck
down Florida death penalty procedures that allowed judicial imposition
of death after an advisory recommendation from the jury.125 This was
because a court’s judgment favoring death could rest on aggravating factors different from those the jury determined beyond a reasonable
doubt.126 Overruling earlier decisions to the contrary, the Court plainly
held: “The Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each
fact necessary to impose a sentence of death. A jury’s mere recommendation is not enough.”127
Here, again, beyond establishing specific procedural requirements,
these decisions imply a belief in sentencing as a judicial-branch function—whether it is one to be exercised by judge or jury given the specifics
of a given case—and a process that involves a hearing in a court of law.
Neither are being provided in Miller remedy cases sent directly to parole
boards for penalty review.

119. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251–52 (1999); see also United States
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005).
120. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); see also Jones, 526 U.S. at
251–52.
121. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483–84.
122. See generally id.; United States v. Fatico, 441 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), rev’d,
579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978).
123. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
124. See LINDA E. CARTER & ELLEN KREITZBERG, UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW 350–51 (2004).
125. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 624 (2016).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 619.
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SUBSTANTIVE SENTENCING REQUIREMENTS

The Court has also established a range of substantive rights that apply
to state criminal punishments, in addition to procedural protections. Even
if these cases do not expressly announce such a requirement, they also
rest on a penalty phase process under judicial watch—not executive authority. They also provide further understanding of constitutional protections being denied in Miller sentence review matters that were sent
directly to parole boards without in-court resentencing.
1. Cruel, Arbitrary, or Discriminatory
In Wilkerson v. Utah, decided in 1878, the Court permitted death by
firing squad as ordered by the trial judge because it was consistent with
the options provided by statute.128 But it indicated that acts of “unnecessary cruelty”—such as being “embowelled alive” or “quartered”—would
be inconsistent with community norms in the United States at the time.129
In Furman v. Georgia, the Court’s per curium opinion struck not just one
death sentence as unconstitutional but death sanctions for a group of defendants whose cases were appealed from both Georgia and Texas.130 In
individual concurring decisions, Justices explained the death sentence
schemes in these jurisdictions generated highly arbitrary results. For instance, Justice Douglas noted that their modes of execution might not be
“inhuman and barbarous,”131 as described in Wilkerson, but the method
for deciding who would be executed lacked the rationality needed to survive a constitutional challenge.132
Outside of the death penalty context, the Court has seldom applied the
Eighth Amendment analyses used in Wilkerson or Furman. However, in
Robinson v. California, the Court did grant relief for a defendant sentenced to ninety days under a California statute based upon his status as a
drug addict.133 In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas explained that
imprisonment due to being diseased is the kind of “barbarous action” the
Court warned about in past decisions.134 On the other hand, Justice
Harlan’s concurrence expressed concern about “arbitrar[iness]” inherent
in jailing a drug-addicted person for the passive act of merely being present in a state.135
These death and non-death cases relating to cruel or arbitrary punishments also demonstrate an embrace of judicial branch criminal penalty
128. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 132–33 (1878).
129. Id. at 135–36.
130. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam).
131. Id. at 241 (Douglas, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 253; see also Olivia B. Waxman, The Story of the Last U.S. Execution Before
a Nationwide Moratorium Took Effect 50 Years Ago, TIME (June 2, 2017), https://time.com/
4801239/last-execuction-before-moratorium/ [https://perma.cc/HC6H-J9DM].
133. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667–68 (1962).
134. Id. at 675–78 (Douglas, J., concurring) (comparing Robinson’s sentence to the
“rack and thumbscrew” condemned in earlier Eighth Amendment cases).
135. Id. at 678–79 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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determinations. For instance, the Wilkerson Court spent a great deal of
time describing the actual sentencing hearing held before “the presiding
justice in open court,” as wholly consistent with the Constitution.136 It
further noted “the duty” of describing the mode of punishment “is devolved upon the court authorized to pass the sentence.”137 Similarly, in
both Furman and Robinson, when finding the sentences constitutionally
problematic, the Court clearly proceeded on the assumption that any subsequent lawful sentencing processes would need to occur in a court.138
The Court also has held “invidious discrimination” at sentencing violates constitutional equal protection principles.139 In 1970, it set aside the
incarcerative sentence in Williams v. Illinois, where the defendant failed
to pay his fine due to indigence.140 The Court warned that the poor could
not be sentenced to longer terms for failure to satisfy their fines.141 To do
so would be to create improper classification based upon wealth or lack
thereof.142
To date, the Court has not invalidated a sentence or sentencing scheme
based upon racial discrimination. It side-stepped such a finding in McCleskey v. Kemp, noting the defendant needed evidence of purposeful
discrimination in his case to support an equal protection claim.143 Instead,
he offered generalized data about the system as a whole.144 Notably, in
both Williams and McCleskey, the Court assumed that sentencing proceedings would be part of a trial court record and, thus, would be available to review.145
2. Proportionality and Special Individualization
Finally, under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,146 the Court has developed a separate body of law that
focuses on the issue of excessiveness of a sanction: proportionality jurisprudence. As previously noted, for years the Court applied two different
tests for such matters—one for death penalty cases where the court considered evolving standards of decency, which included bringing its own
independent judgment to bear.147 It used another for non-death cases,
where the Court reviewed matters for gross disproportionality with great
136. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 130–31 (1878).
137. Id. at 137.
138. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 253 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (per curiam)
(describing sentencing in the judicial branch); Robinson, 370 U.S. at 664 (majority opinion)
(describing the role of the court in interpreting and applying criminal sentencing laws).
139. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 242–44 (1970).
140. Id. at 241.
141. Id. at 241–42.
142. See id. 240–41.
143. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292–93 (1987).
144. Id. at 293.
145. See, e.g., id. at 255–56.
146. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
147. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
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deference to state sentencing determinations.148 In both sets of cases,
however, it was clear from the context and Court’s analyses that the judicial branch was the intended site of sentencing.149
In extending its evolving standards of decency test outside of the execution arena to cases of youthful offenders, the Court reiterated common
understandings of the role of the judiciary at sentencing. In Miller, writing
for a five-member majority which included Justice Kennedy, Justice Kagan noted, “Graham, Roper, and our individualized sentencing decisions
make clear that a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider
mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty
for juveniles.”150 Thus, the Court suggested a specialized individualized
narrowing and proportionality approach in juvenile sentencing cases, akin
to those applied in death penalty matters.151
This language in Miller, of course, offers a very different vision of penalty assessments than Justice Kennedy’s passing parole board proposal in
Montgomery. Cases decided after Montgomery also align with the view
that juvenile matters need to be carefully evaluated at the time of sentencing within the judicial branch. Adams v. Alabama, for instance, describes specialized sentencing processes in a court of law.152 Adams was
decided along with several consolidated matters where most of the youthful offenders had initially faced the death penalty, but whose sentences
were converted to life without parole after the decision in Roper. In all of
the cases, certiorari was granted, the judgments were vacated, and the
matters were remanded for “further consideration in light of Montgomery
v. Louisiana.”153
Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg, who were part of the majority in
Montgomery, clarified that even these cases needed to be reviewed anew
in courts of law.154 That is, an “exacting” fact-finding would need to take
place in court before any such defendant could be seen as among the rare
few for whom future release could be denied.155 There is “no shortcut,”
Justice Sotomayor wrote, for lower courts weighing “the difficult but essential question whether petitioners are among the very ‘rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.’”156
Justices Alito and Thomas, who dissented in Montgomery, agreed:
As a result of Montgomery and Miller, States must now ensure that
prisoners serving sentences of life without parole for offenses committed before the age of 18 have the benefit of an individualized sen148. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277, 290 (1983).
149. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 993; Solem, 463 U.S. at 283–84.
150. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012).
151. Id.
152. See generally Adams v. Alabama, 136 S. Ct. 1796 (2016).
153. Id. at 1796–97.
154. Id. at 1799 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1801 (citing Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016)).
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tencing procedure that considers their youth and immaturity at the
time of the offense.157
Such recent recommitment to courtroom penalty phase proceedings
renders Justice Kennedy’s suggestion—that parole proceedings might replace court sentencing in at least some Miller remedy cases—even more
puzzling. When further contextualized within the historically limited role
and ongoing problematic activities of parole boards, it becomes more apparent they are patently incapable of displacing sentencing courts in
Miller cases or any other criminal imprisonment matters.
IV. PAROLE BOARDS AS LIMITED AND LARGELY
EXTRA-LEGAL EXECUTIVE AGENCIES
A. ESTABLISHMENT

OF THE

EXECUTIVE BRANCH MERCY FUNCTION

Our federal tripartite system of government dates back to the colonial
era. The Federalist Papers provide that the federal legislature, judiciary,
and elected executive should each have separate designated tasks.158 This
was meant to protect against many of the abuses that occurred in common law England.159 This included overreach by the crown, which at
times exerted absolutist control over the British court system, leading at
times to imposition of overly harsh and horrific punishments for those
who dared to dissent.160
The Federalist Papers thus articulated an extremely restricted role for
the federal executive branch when it came to criminal sanctions—intervening after a penalty was imposed only to grant reprieves or pardons as
157. Id. at 1797 (Alito, J., concurring). This separate concurrence does suggest some
juvenile life without parole sentences might be upheld without another resentencing hearing, but that would only occur where the “original sentencing jury fulfilled the individualized sentencing requirement that Miller subsequently imposed.” Id. at 1798.
158. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 245 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“The
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands,
whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”).
159. Id. at 247 (“Were the power of judging joined . . . . to the executive power, the
judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor.”) (quoting Montisquieu). In this
way, the families of early immigrants to the United States shaped and informed new governmental practices based upon their prior negative life experiences—rather than being
punished or ostracized because of them. Cf. Eugene Scott, Trump’s Most Insulting—and
Violent—Language Is Often Reserved for Immigrants, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2019), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/02/trumps-most-insulting-violent-language-isoften-reserved-immigrants/ [https://perma.cc/9N7W-U3RP].
160. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 967–68 (1991) (“Most historians agree
that the ‘cruell and unusuall Punishments’ provision of the English Declaration of Rights
was prompted by the abuses attributed to the infamous Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys of the
King’s Bench during the Stuart reign of James II. They do not agree, however, on which
abuses.”) (internal citations omitted). For more on the terms “unusual” and “cruel,” see
generally Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969); John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of
“Cruel,” 105 GEO. L.J. 441 (2017); John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”:
The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739 (2008);
What Is Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 24 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1910).
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a form of benevolence and mercy.161 These ideas were largely formalized
in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, which provides the president
with power to grant reprieves or pardons in federal criminal cases.162 But
this provision makes clear that executive intervention is solely for the
purpose of softening or reducing a given sentence, not to impose a penalty or expand it.163
As further discussed below, individual states have not been required to
comply with Article I, II, and III separation-of-powers principles.164 Yet,
most jurisdictions have adopted the same tripartite system,165 with state
judicial branches serving as sentencing entities and governors as executive actors having power to grant clemency from harsh determinate
sanctions.166
B. BRIEF SHIFT

INDETERMINACY AND LIMITED POWER
TO PAROLE BOARDS

TO

At the start of the twentieth century, indeterminate sentencing was introduced as a new method of sanction to allow for greater focus on defendant rehabilitation.167 Under this new model, rather than select a set term
of imprisonment—such as three years—courts were called upon to impose an appropriate sentencing range—such as three to twenty years’ incarceration.168 This resulted in the birth of parole and parole boards as
executive branch agencies becoming involved on the back end of punishment process.169
161. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Daniel T.
Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69
TEX. L. REV. 569, 589–95 (1991).
162. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
163. See, e.g., Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927) (upholding presidential decision to convert death sentence to life in prison; “inflicting less [punishment] than what the
judgment fixed” within the executive’s power); see also Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256,
263–64 (1974).
164. See U.S. CONST. art. I, II, III; see also Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV.
1167, 1188 (1999) (“Despite the Federalist views of separation of powers, the U.S. Constitution fails to dictate a specific form of separation of powers for state governments.”).
165. See John Devlin, Toward a State Constitutional Analysis of Allocation of Powers:
Legislators and Legislative Appointees Performing Administrative Functions, 66 TEMP. L.
REV. 1205, 1219–21 (1993) (describing how state courts generally look to federal separation of powers cases for guidance—but that the two sets of doctrines are independent).
166. See DIRK VAN ZYL SMIT & CATHERINE APPLETON, LIFE IMPRISONMENT: A
GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS ANALYSIS 163 (2019) (“[A] peculiarity of life sentences is that
they may be imposed by the executive, when commuting death sentences.”).
167. See Reingold & Thomas, supra note 68, at 598 (during the first part of the last
century, determinate penalties were replaced with indeterminate sentencing schemes in
both the federal and state systems); see also Katherine Puzauskas & Kevin Morrow, No
Indeterminate Sentencing Without Parole, 44 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 263, 266 (2018).
168. See Richard A. Bierschbach, Proportionality and Parole, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1745,
1750–51 (2018) (describing shift from retributive system to one that allowed for more utilitarian concerns, like rehabilitation, by way of indeterminate sentences).
169. See Matthew Drecun, Note, Cruel and Unusual Parole, 95 TEX. L. REV. 707, 709
(2017) (indicating that by 1930, nearly all states and the federal government maintained
their own parole systems).
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Parole agencies and parole boards were tasked with determining,
within the period already imposed by the court, when an inmate should
be released from prison.170 Such thinking was also applied in life-sentence matters. At least in theory, these decisions were based upon personal progress and defendant rehabilitation, as well as current safety
risk.171 Despite these supposed benevolent concerns, parole systems drew
criticism from the beginning.172
Some state-level parole board models were successfully challenged as
legislative encroachments upon the limited right of reprieve granted to
governors.173 For instance, in 1901, Vermont’s governor sought an advisory opinion from the state’s high court regarding the legality of the
Board of Prison Commissioners, which was established under a new state
legislative enactment.174 In response, the Vermont Supreme Court found
the act unconstitutional under the state separation of powers doctrine.175
Specifically, it held: “The effect of this act would be to transfer the power
of conditional pardon from the governor to the Board of Prison Commissioners, which, as before seen, cannot be done by legislative action . . . .”176 Similar successful challenges were advanced in Utah and
Michigan.177
But as such matters percolated up to the Supreme Court, it found they
did not implicate the federal Constitution.178 Specifically, in 1902, Illinois’s system was challenged in Dryer v. Illinois for conferring “judicial
powers upon a collection of persons who do not belong to the judicial
department, and, in effect, invest[ing] them with the pardoning power
committed by the constitution to the Governor of the State.”179 But the
Court made clear that states were free to structure their state governments as they wished. Accordingly, federal separation of powers principles were not deployed to address the issue.180 Parole boards and
170. See Bierschbach, supra note 168, at 1779; see also Rachel E. Barkow & Kathleen
M. O’Neill, Delegating Punitive Power: The Political Economy of Sentencing Commission
and Guidelines Formation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1973, 1991 (2006) (“Parole officials also exercised authority over sentencing in these indeterminate regimes, though their authority was
derivative of judicial authority. Specifically, while parole officials determined an offender’s
ultimate release date, the judicial sentence set the parameters within which parole officials
operated.”).
171. See Kimberly Thomas & Paul Reingold, From Grace to Grids: Rethinking Due
Process Protection for Parole, 170 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 213, 216–17 (2017) (during
“most of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, parole as we know it today did not exist”); see also Michael Willrich, The Two Percent Solution: Eugenic Jurisprudence and the
Socialization of American Law, 1900-1930, 16 L. & HIST. REV. 63, 77 (1998).
172. See Puzauskas & Morrow, supra note 167, at 270–71.
173. See, e.g., People v. Cummings, 50 N.W. 310, 311–12 (Mich. 1891); State ex rel.
Bishop v. State Bd. of Corrs., 52 P. 1090, 1090 (Utah 1898); In re Conditional Discharge of
Convicts, 51 A. 10, 13 (Vt. 1901).
174. See Conditional Discharge of Convicts, 51 A. at 12.
175. Id. at 15.
176. Id. at 12.
177. See generally Cummings, 50 N.W. 310; Bishop, 52 P. 1090.
178. See Puzauskas & Morrow, supra note 167, at 270–71.
179. Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 83–84 (1902).
180. See id.
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sentencing courts were left to coexist in the states.
Over the next few decades, both the federal government and individual
states tweaked their parole systems in response to legal concerns.181 And
parole boards became a regular part of the correctional landscape. As a
result, many studies and scholars referred to them as working in tandem
with courts and playing a significant role in indeterminate sentencing.182
But they remained limited in power—allowed only to discharge defendants from incarceration, not pronounce penalties in the first instance.
Over time the parole system drew further criticism.183 For instance, in
1967, the President’s Crime Commission documented wide-spread
problems of recidivism despite the use of indeterminate sentencing and
parole supervision.184 And during the 1970s, “[b]ecause few parole
boards had explicit criteria or policies for their release decisions, those
decisions were criticized as arbitrary and capricious.”185 Data demonstrated the agencies were producing vast differences among similar cases,
including racial disparities in release outcomes.186 It seemed everyone
from attorneys to academics to religious organizations believed that,
overall, the parole model undermined fairness in the punishment
process.187
C. DE-COURTIFICATION

OF

STATE PAROLE BOARDS

In contrast to earlier litigation that challenged the existence of parole
boards, by the 1970s cases now attacked their increasingly lax processes.
But rather than correct what was seen as growing irrationality in the parole grant system, the Supreme Court somewhat inscrutably gave state
parole agencies greater license to engage in ad hoc activities.
181. See Puzauskas & Morrow, supra note 167, at 271–72.
182. See, e.g., Jon O. Newman, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 814 (1975) (“Although parole release decisions have been regarded
as virtually autonomous from sentencing per se, parole is an integral part of the sentencing
and correctional process.”).
183. See Edward E. Rhine et al., The Future of Parole Release, 46 CRIME & JUST. 279,
279 (2016) (“Starting in the 1970s and continuing through the 1990s, parole boards witnessed a precipitous loss of legitimacy.”).
184. See Puzauskas & Morrow, supra note 167, at 271.
185. A HANDBOOK FOR NEW PAROLE BOARD MEMBERS, supra note 50, at 5 (“It was
asserted that these decisions were driven more by the individual prejudices and idiosyncrasies of board members than by research-based predictions of parole success.”).
186. See Dhammika Dharmapala et al., Legislatures, Judges, and Parole Boards: The
Allocation of Discretion Under Determinate Sentencing, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1037, 1042–43
(2010); see also Puzauskas & Morrow, supra note 167, at 271.
187. See generally Anne M. Heinz et al., Sentencing by Parole Board: An Evaluation, 67
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1976) (cataloging complaints about parole boards from
various groups). Both Heinz’s report, which focused on the Illinois parole system, and a
Yale Law Review study of federal parole provided harsh critiques of existing frameworks
and practices. See generally Newman, supra note 182. Yet, strangely, both publications also
noted that parole boards, at least theoretically, might be given additional sentencing responsibility including involvement in front-end penalty decisions. Not surprisingly, as further described in the next section, decision makers at the time entirely discounted such
possibilities.
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Most notably, in Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska, the Court acknowledged the largely discretionary nature of the parole grant process
that had emerged across the states.188 Instead of reining in such activities,
the Court held, “There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid
sentence.”189 Instead, unless the state created a promise of release by way
of statute, an inmate possessed no recognized constitutional “liberty interest” in early discharge.190
Significantly, the Court contrasted the informal administrative parole
release process with adversarial proceedings where a court decides
whether to “convict or confine” a defendant. Accordingly, it noted state
parole boards were free to establish whatever system they believed appropriate for their limited roles—including relying exclusively on information in their own files and withholding such “evidence” from inmates
under review.191 Nor did states have to provide appointed counsel for
such hearings.192 In this way, parole grant “hearings” demanded far fewer
formalities and protections than what the Court described just a few years
earlier in Morrissey v. Brewer193 and Gagnon v. Scarpelli.194 Those cases
addressed parole board revocation of conditional parole and ending liberty where a rational process was required and the right to counsel
presumed.195
D. RETURN

TO

DETERMINACY

AND

RECOMMITMENT

TO

COURTS

As a result of Greenholtz, parole board work was essentially split into
two very different domains with revocation proceedings requiring heightened protections for defendants196 while parole grant processes became
188. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7–9 (1979);
see also Thomas & Reingold, supra note 171, at 214–15.
189. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7.
190. Id. at 12.
191. See id. at 7–12.
192. See id.
193. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
194. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
195. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 9 (“The fallacy in respondents’ position is that parole release and parole revocation are quite different. There is a crucial distinction between being
deprived of a liberty one has, as in parole, and being denied a conditional liberty that one
desires.”).
196. This said, today there are widespread problems in the country’s parole revocation
practices that further reflect the system dysfunction. For instance, this author filed a successful class action lawsuit challenging Missouri’s parole revocation policies and practices.
See Matthew Clarke, MacArthur Justice Center Files Lawsuit Over Missouri Parole Revocations, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (June 5, 2018), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2018/jun/
5/macauthur-justice-center-files-lawsuit-over-missouri-parole-revocations/ [https://perma
.cc/EXL7-2P2S]; Dan Margolies, Thousands of Missouri Inmates Whose Paroles Were Revoked May Be Entitled To Relief, Judge Rules, KCUR (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.kcur
.org/post/thousands-missouri-inmates-whose-paroles-were-revoked-may-be-entitled-reliefjudge-rules#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/U92K-ZDVD] (announcing summary judgment
class win on parole revocation challenge and finding Missouri’s entire parole revocation
system unconstitutional for lack of hearings or attorney appointments).
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essentially extra-legal.197 In fact, some states—like Missouri—revisited
their parole laws to remove language and ensure inmates could not argue
they had a “liberty interest” in early release.198 However, other states
decided to simply abolish their parole systems, as did the federal government.199 Thus, by the 1980s, determinate sentencing largely came back
into vogue.200 And in many places, sentencing became informed by
guidelines that attempted to promote fairness and avoid the unpredictability of the parole process.201
For instance, in 1984, the Sentencing Reform Act created the Federal
Sentencing Commission (the Commission), which promulgated guidelines
to promote proportionality and sentence uniformity.202 But while the
Commission had a great deal of power,203 the trial court remained the
locus of sentencing.204 The Act retained a fundamental commitment to
judicial branch criminal punishment proceedings.205
The Commission was also challenged for violating separation of powers
principles by abdicating congressional power to agency-like actors housed
in the judicial branch.206 The Supreme Court rejected the claim, explaining that the Commission fell within a “twilight” area of systemic innovation and judicial rule-making.207 It did not encroach upon the judicial
branch’s core function as primary arbiter of individual cases and
controversies.208
Recent cases have also reiterated the primacy of the judicial branch
197. See, e.g., Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 366–67 (1998) (reiterating informal nature of parole grant proceedings); Thomas & Reingold, supra note 171, at
225–27 (describing recent cases post-Greenholtz that arguably increase parole board autonomy); see also Victoria Palacios, Go and Sin No More: Rationality and Release Decisions by Parole Boards, 45 S.C. L. REV. 567, 578–79 (1994).
198. See Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 378 n.10 (1987) (finding Montana to be
an outlying state that retained a parole grant liberty interest while many more states did
not); see also, e.g., Ingrassia v. Purkett, 985 F.2d 987, 988 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that Missouri law now provides “almost unlimited discretion” to the parole board, without any
“liberty interest” in release for inmates).
199. See Rhine et al., supra note 183, at 279.
200. See id.; see also Beth Schwartzapfel, Parole Boards: Problems and Promise, 28
FED. SENT. R. 79, 80 (2015) (reporting that “truth in sentencing” became a mantra for
many during this period).
201. See generally SENTENCING REFORM IN OVERCROWDED TIMES (Michael Tonry &
Kathleen Hatlestad eds., 1997) (collecting essays on emergence of sentencing guidelines
schemes across the country and reemergence of determinate sentencing).
202. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3551; 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998.
203. See Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1342 (2016) (describing
United States Sentencing Commission).
204. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (section titled, “Imposition of a Sentence”).
205. See id.; see also Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge’s First Impressions of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 52 ALB. L. REV. 1, 1 (1997) (describing adoption of the Sentencing
Commission’s Federal Sentencing Guidelines as an effort to create greater “consistency,
uniformity and fairness” in federal sentencing).
206. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989).
207. Id. at 386.
208. See id. at 389–90.
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when it comes to setting individual sentences.209 For instance, in 2005, the
Court declared once and for all, in United States v. Booker, that the federal Sentencing Guidelines were merely advisory.210 In doing so, it reminded criminal justice stakeholders that the Commission “makes
political and substantive decisions” about recommended sentencing
ranges, “rather than performing adjudicatory functions,” which firmly remain with the judicial branch.211
Booker further clarified when a jury would need to hear sentencing
facts and render a judgment beyond a reasonable doubt.212 Read together with the other jury sentencing cases decided during this period—
such as Apprendi, Ring, and Hurst described above—the Court’s assumption that federal and state imprisonment terms would always be imposed
in a courtroom is plain.213 On the state level, a similar shift away from
agency influence on criminal penalties and parole board impact on
sentences took place during this time.214
V. CONSTITUTIONAL SENTENCING INCAPACITY OF
CONTEMPORARY PAROLE BOARDS
A. OVERVIEW

OF

STATE PAROLE BOARDS TODAY

Given this history, state corrections leadership has been forced to admit that today, “parole occupies a somewhat ambiguous place” in the
criminal justice system.215 More than this, criticisms of parole practices,
which in many places have become more like an “assembly line” than a
legal proceeding, have increased.216 As the Robina Institute on Criminal
Justice at the University of Minnesota has documented, currently:
The right to be heard during the parole consideration process . . . is
minimal. A personal interview with a prisoner will suffice; in addition, parole hearings do not need to be public and the inmate does
not have a universal right to be present. The hearing itself may be
209. See Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1776 (“To be sure, the Guidelines are
advisory only, and so not every sentence will be consistent with the relevant Guidelines
range.”).
210. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
211. Id. at 242.
212. Id. at 244.
213. See supra Part III.B.3.
214. See, e.g., A HANDBOOK FOR NEW PAROLE BOARD MEMBERS, supra note 50, at 1
(“[O]ver 55 percent of all releases from state prisons were as a result of a discretionary
decision by a paroling authority” in 1980 while “only about 25 percent of such releases
were made by paroling authorities” in 1999).
215. Id.
216. Robert Gebeloff et al., A Parole Decision in Minutes, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2016),
https://nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/04/nyregion/new-york-parole-decision-in-minutes
.html [https://perma.cc/22GM-LEPC]; see also Beth Schwartzapfel, Life Without Parole,
MARSHALL PROJECT (July 10, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/07/10/lifewithout-parole [https://perma.cc/VH6D-WLP5] (interviewing former Georgia parole board
member who admitted to voting on 100 cases a day, noting the “public would be astounded” how little time is spent on even “life and death cases”).
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conducted by a board representative, rather than a member of the
board.217
For instance, an investigation of New York parole hearings in 2016
demonstrated that “inmates [were] given mere minutes to make a case
for their freedom,” often by way of video conference, and decisions denying parole were issued on “boilerplate” forms and seemed “arbitrary”
given similarity in facts.218 Further review of New York state parole decisions during this time showed that, while one in four white men were
released at their first hearing, first time release was granted for only one
in six men of color.219
In 2017, the New Hampshire Parole Board was outed for its utter lack
of professionalism and abuse of prisoners who appeared before it. Rather
than conduct hearings with “civility,” board members insulted and intimidated inmates with profanity, foul language, and mockery of mental
health issues.220 Among other things, those seeking release were confronted with statements like: “I know I shouldn’t be chewing your ass like
this but you know damn well what I’m talkin’ about”; “[t]he thing about a
good car salesman is they know how to blow smoke up your ass while
smiling to your face and telling you absolutely lies”; and “I think you’re
full of shit, and I think you’re trying to sell a nice boat down the river.”221
In the latter instance, the New Hampshire board member went on to
question the defendant about his medication.222 When the defendant indicated he took pills for anxiety, the board member declared he
presented more like someone who had bipolar disorder and needed more
sleep.223
Unfortunately, reports of ad hoc, unprofessional, and unreliable parole
board decision-making permeate the news and contemporary criminal
justice landscape.224 This is true even in states that have shifted absolute
217. Alexis Watts, Parole Release Reconsideration in States with Discretionary Release,
ROBINA INST. (Apr. 7, 2017), http://robinainstitute.umn.edu/news-views/parole-release-re
consideration-states-discretionary-release [https://perma.cc/D9YJ-WL4X].
218. Gebeloff et al., supra note 216.
219. Michael Winerip et al., For Blacks Facing Parole in New York State, Signs of a
Broken System, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/04/nyregion/
new-york-prisons-inmates-parole-race.html [https://perma.cc/9LJE-CHDU].
220. Emily Corwin, “You’re Full of #$*@!” At N.H. Parole Board, Tough Talk Can
Veer to the Profane, N.H. PUB. RADIO (June 27, 2017), https://www.nhpr.org/post/yourefull-nh-parole-board-tough-talk-can-veer-profane [https://perma.cc/QR8E-G9YC].
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See, e.g., VAN ZYL SMIT & APPLETON, supra note 166, at 251 (“[P]arole mechanisms in the United States have striking shortcomings at all levels.”); Jorge Renaud, Grading the Parole Release Systems of All 50 States, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Feb. 26, 2019),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/grading_parole.html [https://perma.cc/5JZ3-T39F]
(giving the grade of “B” to only one state parole system, while all others achieved grades
of “C,” “D” or “F” based upon “fairness and equity” factors, such as providing in-person
hearings); Quandt, supra note 57 (asserting that as of 2018, “corruption and malfeasance”
are getting in the way of parole decisions around the country). See generally SENT’G PROJECT, DELAYING A SECOND CHANCE: THE DECLINING PROSPECTS FOR PAROLE ON LIFE
SENTENCES (2017), https://sentencingproject.org/publications/delaying-second-chance-de
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resentencing authority to parole boards in Miller-impacted, youthful offender matters.225 For instance, returning to our Missouri case study, the
MacArthur Justice Center in St. Louis filed freedom of information requests to investigate practices of Missouri’s Parole Board in 2017, based
upon rumors among inmates and others. Those requests surfaced documents confirming what had been reported—that countless Missouri release hearings had turned into literal games for the enjoyment of one of
the parole board members, Don Ruzicka.226
Ruzicka had coaxed colleagues to inject nonsensical words into the
proceedings—such as “platypus” or “armadillo”—or song lyrics—such as
“Folsom Prison Blues” or “Soul Man.” Each staff member who managed
to get an inmate to repeat the word or lyric would earn a point.227 The
goal was to earn the most points by the end of day’s parole hearing
docket.228 Ruzicka and other hearing officers could be heard laughing on
tapes of the proceedings, joking during testimony, and saying things like,
“I just got four points.” Although the state had conducted its own internal investigation substantiating these actions, no serious disciplinary action was taken.229
It was not until a press conference was called to shed light on these
activities months after the fact, resulting in national attention, that the
offending board member was pressured to resign.230 And that was only
after that official oversaw at least some of Missouri’s Miller-related sentence review hearings—including in the case of Norman Brown referenced above.231
Brown was denied access to his parole file in advance of his Miller parole board sentence review hearing, precluded from meaningfully challenging erroneous or unreliable information that might be in the file, and
allowed to bring only one person with him into the hearing room—either
clining-prospects-parole-life-sentences/ [https://perma.cc/C2NU-HFD7] (documenting a
variety of problems impacting parole board decision-making, including informal
prosecutorial and political influence that may dictate outcomes).
225. See Renaud, supra note 224, at app. (giving failing grades to states like Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Missouri, in part because prosecutors and victims can unduly influence parole board decision-making).
226. Jesse Bogan, Missouri Parole Board Played Word Games During Hearings with
Inmates, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (June 9, 2017), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/
crime-and-courts/missouri-parole-board-played-word-games-during-hearings-with-in
mates/article_ce6cba9b-5932-52a4-899a-f7644ec4d7d8.html [https://perma.cc/FDT9-2NE9]
(reporting on this author’s work as Director of the MacArthur Justice Center, its parole
investigation, and subsequent press conference calling for Ruzicka’s removal).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See, e.g., Dakin Andone, Missouri Parole Board Member Resigns for Playing Word
Games During Hearings, CNN (June 12, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/12/us/missou
ri-parole-board-hootenanny-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/7FNV-NCDX]; Associated
Press, Missouri Officials Toyed with Inmates During Parole Hearings, Report Says, ABC
ACTION NEWS (June 9, 2017), https://www.abcactionnews.com/news/national/missouri-offi
cials-toyed-with-inmates-during-parole-hearings-report-says [https://perma.cc/AFZ2RPND].
231. See supra Part II.C; see also Bogan, supra note 226.
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an attorney or a supporter.232 And his attorney was met at the door of the
hearing area and directed to leave pen and paper outside as she would
not be permitted to take notes during the hearing.233
Traditional attorney advocacy on Brown’s behalf was not permitted—
other than to explain in just a few minutes any re-entry support plans that
might be in place.234 In contrast, the parole panel heard extensive comments from the wife of the decedent, also a victim of the crime, along
with the original prosecutor who tried the case.235 The prosecutor did not
serve as an attorney. Instead, he was permitted to testify as a witness,
offer his views on why Brown should not be released, and even introduce
diagrams of the crime scene that he drew himself but that had never been
introduced at trial.236 Not surprisingly, just a few days later, Brown
learned that the parole board accepted the prosecutor’s recommendations and, based solely on the seriousness of his offense, would remain
imprisoned.237
MacArthur Justice, along with pro bono counsel at the law firm of
Husch Blackwell, filed a class action on behalf of Brown and the other
youthful offenders directed to the Missouri parole board under Senate
Bill 590.238 Without conceding that parole review could displace courtroom sentencing, the lawsuit argued the hearings denied youthful offenders sufficient process and protection.239 And, indeed, Missouri’s Millerimpacted youthful offenders prevailed on summary judgment in 2018.240
Yet, the Missouri parole board still fails to provide the same procedures and protections during Miller sentence review hearings as would be
provided in a court of law at sentencing.241 Other states that have punted
Miller-fix matters to parole boards also fail to provide impacted youthful
offenders with all of the rights and protections they would be given by the
232. See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra
note 55, at ¶¶ 128–146.
233. This author was that attorney. See Brown v. Precythe, No. 2:17-cv-04082-NKL,
2017 WL 4980872, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 31, 2017) (class action filed by a group of attorneys
in 2017, including this author as co-counsel, challenging unfairness of Missouri parole
board sentence review practices on behalf of all of Missouri’s Miller-impacted inmates).
234. Id. at *5.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at *1.
239. Id. at *6.
240. Order at *10, Brown v. Precythe, 2018 WL 4956519 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 12, 2018) (No.
2:17-cv-04082-NKL) (ordering state to submit plan to provide Miller-impacted inmates
with meaningful and constitutionally compliant sentence review process).
241. See generally, e.g., Plan for Compliance with Applicable Requirements, Brown v.
Precythe, No. 2:17-cv-04082-NKL (W.D. Mo. Mar. 4, 2019) (proposing, among other
things, that Miller-impacted inmates would now be allowed to have up to four individuals
attend their life without parole review hearing—including counsel and an expert—but that
the state would not provide funds for representation or experts for the sentence review
process). The State of Missouri’s Attorney General’s Office is also now seeking to appeal
the trial court’s finding that Miller created a liberty interest for youthful offenders for purposes of parole consideration.
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judicial branch.242 Thus, contemporary state parole boards remain largely
incapable of serving as the sole resentencers in Miller-impacted matters.
And permitting parole board punishment practices to continue over objections presents a serious threat to the historic norms and integrity of the
justice system.
B. PENUMBRAL RIGHT

TO

JUDICIAL BRANCH PENALTY PHASE

It is impossible to imagine federal courts having their sentencing authority entirely stripped and redelegated to an executive body.243 If this
issue arose on the federal level, it seems likely that the Supreme Court
would declare, once and for all, that sentencing is a judicial branch function under Article III of the Constitution—even during this era of increased federal agency autonomy.244 But because the federal government
no longer actively maintains a parole system, this will not occur.245 Nevertheless, federal separation-of-powers norms should be instructive when
considering the constitutionality of this practice on the state level—despite older state parole cases like Dryer.246
As noted, every state now maintains a tripartite government in the image of the federal system.247 To be sure, there are subtle differences in
branch powers at the state level as compared to the federal system.248 But
242. See, e.g., State v. Williams-Bey, 144 A.3d 467, 489 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016).
243. See Michael S. Greco, President’s Message, Lawyers Have a Lot to Teach, 91 ABA
J. 6, 6 (2005) (ABA President urges attorneys to help educate public about the importance
of separation of powers and independent judiciary as part of the “fabric of our republic”).
244. See generally Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals:
An Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227 (2016)
(providing an account of administrative agencies as an extra-constitutional component of
government that may be seen as part of the “new separation of powers” landscape); see
also Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
515, 517 (2015).
245. Jonathan Turley, Madisonian Tectonics: How Form Follows Function in Constitutional and Architectural Interpretation, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 305, 313 (2015) (the term
“separation of powers . . . is not mentioned in the text but permeates the constitutional
structure as an architectural theme”).
246. Indeed, the issue in Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902), was not whether a parole
board could serve as a sentencing body to the exclusion of courts. The case challenged the
creation of the parole system—which involved court-based sentencing in the first instance,
followed by possible discretionary release akin to clemency. Id. at 78–85. In addition, much
has changed since Dryer was decided in 1902. In these ways, perhaps Dryer and similar
cases are now open to question. See Perry L. Moriearty, Implementing Proportionality, 50
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 961, 961–62 (2017) (suggesting deference to state autonomy might
need to give way because of “slippage” taking place around substantial Eighth Amendment rights); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58
STAN. L. REV. 989, 1053 (noting that, to date, “the Supreme Court and scholars have overlooked the importance of separation of powers in the criminal context”).
247. See Devlin, supra note 165, at 1205 (“The three-part division of sovereign authority among largely independent legislative, executive, and judicial branches, and the competing principle of ‘checks and balances’ among those branches, have been and remain
cornerstones of the American system of government, both state and federal.”).
248. See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 164, at 1190–91; see also Jonathan Zasloff, Taking Politics Seriously: A Theory of California’s Separation of Powers, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1079, 1109
(2004) (noting differences between the California Constitution and the federal
Constitution).
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common sense suggests that some actions on the part of individual states
would so offend our respect for separation of powers that they should be
prohibited under the U.S. Constitution.249 For instance, if states decided
to do away with their judicial government branches entirely, it is safe to
assume the Supreme Court would stop such actions if asked to do so. If
this did not occur based upon a strict separation-of-powers claim, more
generalized due process arguments would likely be brought to bear to
ensure state judiciaries were not dismantled.250
Even if constitutional separation-of-powers doctrine or some close approximation does not require the state judicial branch to impose criminal
penalties in the first instance, this does not end the discussion. The concept of court-centered sentencing is more than mere backdrop in the
Court’s criminal punishment cases described in Part III. Application of
the Court’s past penumbral reasoning provides further grounds for deeming the judicial branch the only constitutionally appropriate entity for
sentencing.251 No different from individual liberties jurisprudence in
other areas, the overlap and reverberations of recognized rights give rise
to the further free-standing constitutional right of punishment imposition
in a court of law.252
Both the right to counsel at sentencing and due process fairness have
been mandated by the Supreme Court in federal and state criminal
cases.253 These mandates imply oversight by the court system to ensure
delivery of these protections around criminal punishment. Indeed, the
Court has recognized many other rights and requirements not contained
in the Constitution’s text—from privacy,254 to specially worded warnings,255 to specific timeframes.256 And it has done so by either situating
them within existing provisions where they seem most at home—like Mi249. See Robert A. Shapiro, Contingency and Universalism in State Separation of Powers Discourse, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 79, 80 (1998) (acknowledging “federal precedent sets the terms for much state separation of powers debate, and federal principles
provide a presumptive standard for state constitutional decisions”); cf. U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State . . . a Republican Form of Government . . . .”); Quinn, In Loco Juvenile Justice, supra note 12, at 1294–95 (advancing similar
analysis regarding states dismantling their juvenile courts).
250. Fortunately, this is merely a hypothetical. It is hard to conceive of a state giving all
judicial authority to the executive—even from a strong state’s rights perspective. Zasloff,
supra note 248, at 1098 (“Whatever an executive might be, it certainly is not the ‘dispenser
of justice’ in most people’s minds. That title—whether deserved or not—belongs to a
court.”). In addition, as further analyzed below, core functions of courts in criminal cases—
largely required in each of the states because of the incorporation doctrine—would further
preclude such a move.
251. Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Comfortably Penumbral, 77 B.U.
L. REV. 1089, 1096 (1997) (noting Justices on both the Right and the Left have turned to
“penumbral reasoning” to advance constitutional rights).
252. See David Crump, How Do the Courts Really Discover Unenumerated Fundamental Rights? Cataloguing the Methods of Judicial Alchemy, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 795,
854–55 (1996) (explaining that Roe v. Wade, like “[m]ost of the Court’s privacy decisions,”
involved “a leap away from logic founded on strict constitutional premises”).
253. See supra Parts III.B.1–2.
254. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
255. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–69 (1966).
256. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 116–17 (2010).
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randa rights living mostly within the Fifth Amendment257—or establishing their existence at the intersection of recognized rights under the
Constitution.258 With sentencing recognized as a critical stage of the criminal process where counsel and due process protections must be afforded,259 the Court has provided more than adequate support for a
related fundamental right to sentencing in a court of law to emanate
therefrom.260
Thus, separate and apart from the individual procedural or substantive
rights guaranteed during sentencing, reading the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments together should provide for a right to a court-centered penalty phase in all criminal cases involving incarceration—Miller-fix or otherwise. This is so even when the right to jury determination at sentencing
is not implicated.261 But as further explained below, Miller very much
implicates the right to jury determination during the penalty phase. Even
if existing constitutional sentencing rights are not read together to create
an instantiated and free-standing right to a penalty phase in a court of
law, each of the individual rights standing alone should preclude states
from merely redirecting Miller resentencing decisions to existing parole
boards.
C. PAROLE BOARDS

AND

PROCEDURAL INABILITY

TO

PUNISH

Regardless of any new free-standing claim to a constitutional right to
be sentenced in a court of law, parole boards fall far short in Miller sentence review matters—or any other—to serve as sole sentencers. Some
jurisdictions are providing more process than others to try to come close
to looking like judicial branch resentencing hearings. Yet, state parole
boards are unable due to their structures and current practices to wholly
satisfy all the specific procedural rights and substantive protections summarized in Part III.
1. Jury Determinations
For instance, as described earlier, when sentence enhancements are implicated or fact-finding beyond the trial jury’s elements determination is
needed, defendants have a constitutional right to sentencing by jury with
the beyond a reasonable doubt burden placed squarely on the prosecution.262 Several states post-Miller have already provided for jury determi257. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457, 494, 499.
258. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (finding “zones of privacy,” protecting the right to
contraception, inherent in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to the
Constitution); see also David Luban, The Warren Court and the Concept of a Right, 34
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 7, 27–28 (1999).
259. See supra notes 100–104 and accompanying text.
260. Glenn H. Reynolds, Penumbral Reasoning on the Right, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1333,
1344 (1992) (“[P]enumbral reasoning is almost certainly more appropriate in the context of
individual rights than anywhere else.”).
261. See supra Part III.A.3.
262. See supra Part III.C; see also W. David Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel: Apprendi, Indeterminate Sentencing, and the Meaning of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
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nation on the question of whether lifetime incarceration without release
is warranted.263
Life without parole is the most serious sentence that may be imposed
on a child. Consistent with Roper, Graham, and Miller, where life without
parole is a possibility for a juvenile, sentencing must be handled with the
same heightened concerns as with the death penalty for an adult. Appropriate narrowing must take place, and “irreparable corruption” should be
treated like an enhancement above any other term of incarceration as in
Apprendi, Ring, and Hurst. A jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt
that a child is beyond rehabilitation in order to permit lifetime incarceration. Indeed, Missouri utilizes such an approach for new juvenile first degree murder matters.264
But, of course, petit juries have not been involved in the work of executive agencies.265 Contemporary parole boards are unable to lawfully summon and convene jury venires.266 Nor does it appear that any kind of
special process for jury determinations at parole board hearings, postMiller, is occurring.267
In fact, Missouri youthful offenders are not even permitted to have a
hearing before the entire parole board.268 Instead, the hearings are held
before a small parole board panel.269 Yet, the entire board is given the
opportunity to decide on the defendant’s release or continued incarceration—potentially for the rest of their life.270 Other states, including Con893, 921 (2009) (analyzing parole board “second-guessing” facts as Sixth Amendment jury
right issue).
263. See Moore v. Mississippi, No. 2017-KA-00379-SCT, 2019 WL 4316161, at *8–9
(Miss. May 30, 2019); see also Johnson v. Elliott, No. PR 2018-1203, 2019 WL 2251707, at
*7 (Okla. Crim. App. May 24, 2019) (“The Sixth Amendment demands that the trial necessary to impose life without parole on a juvenile homicide offender must be a trial by jury,
unless a jury is affirmatively waived.”).
264. MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.033 (West 2016) (providing for jury sentencing in juvenile
first-degree murder cases); see also State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 239 (Mo. 2013) (remanding for resentencing of youth who received mandatory life without parole, with right to
jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt to uphold life without parole sentence).
265. Cf. Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442, 453 (1947) (holding that federal juries are
without power to pass judgment on actions of federal agencies).
266. See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, HANDBOOK FOR TRIAL JURORS
SERVING IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 1, https://www.flmd.uscourts.gov/sites/
flmd/files/documents/handbook-for-trial-jurors.pdf [https://perma.cc/CP2K-38HV] (last
visited Nov. 5, 2019) (“The judge determines the law to be applied in the case while the
jury decides the facts. Thus, in a very important way, jurors become a part of the court
itself.”); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 40.001 (West 2004) (“The chief judge of each judicial
circuit is vested with overall authority and responsibility for the management, operation,
and oversight of the jury system . . . .”).
267. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 558.047 (West 2016) (codification of Senate Bill 590,
which allows for jury determinations in new juvenile first degree murder cases but not
those matters redirected to the parole board for sentencing review); Diatchenko v. Dist.
Attorney for Suffolk, 1 N.E.3d 270, 276, 280 (Mass. 2013).
268. See BD. OF PROB. & PAROLE, MO. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE GRANTING OF PAROLES AND CONDITIONAL RELEASES 6 (2017) [hereinafter
MISSOURI PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE GRANTING OF PAROLES].
269. Id. (describing use of small panel hearings followed by full board votes).
270. Id. See generally Declaratory & Injunctive Relief Order, Brown v. Precythe, No.
2:17-cv-04082-NKL (W.D. Mo. Aug. 8, 2019).
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necticut and Nevada, also allow a subset of the entire board to conduct
the actual review hearing—never mind full-blown jury hearings and determinations of elements and enhancement facts.271
2. Critical Stage and Right to Counsel
But even if somehow not all Miller-impacted inmates are entitled to
jury determinations beyond a reasonable doubt at resentencing,272 existing parole boards are still ill-suited to deliver on the other individual
procedures insured during a courtroom-based penalty phase. For instance, as sentencing is now seen as a critical phase of the criminal process, free appointed counsel is available to indigent defendants facing
incarceration during court sentencing. Historically, inmates are not entitled to free counsel at parole grant hearings—or even meaningful representation by retained counsel.
Instead, as a matter of parole policies and customs, attorneys are frequently expected to step away from their traditional role when they accompany clients before the parole board.273 As already described, the
standing practice in Missouri has been to relegate counsel to the role of
friend or supporter who is able to shed light on community reentry plans.
They generally are not permitted to cross-examine witnesses, challenge
evidence, or make objections.274
Even after Missouri’s Miller-impacted plaintiffs prevailed on their class
action, attorneys for the parole board filed papers with the district court
seeking to impose limits on the process. The board only agreed to allow
up to four individuals to attend the review hearings for Miller-impacted
inmates, including counsel and an expert—a position adopted by the district court.275 In addition, the state of Missouri continues to refuse to furnish counsel or funds for lawyers.276 Other states also fail to provide
appointment of counsel for Miller-impacted inmates receiving life-without-parole sentence review hearings before the state’s parole board, including Nevada.277
271. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-125a-(f)(1) (West 2015) (providing that panel of the
board may make release decision); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.133 (West 2013) (outlining
method for delegating authority of the full board to a small panel, which may include one
board member along with parole staff).
272. See Sarah French Russell, Jury Sentencing and Juveniles: Eighth Amendment Limits and Sixth Amendment Rights, 56 B.C. L. REV. 553, 586 (2015) (cataloging states that
have been resistant to jury determinations at sentencing in Miller-related court matters);
see also Laura Cohen, Freedom’s Road: Youth, Parole, and the Promise of Miller v. Alabama and Graham v. Florida, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1031, 1064 (2014).
273. See, e.g., Corwin, supra note 220 (recounting experience of defense attorney who
saw parole hearings as a kind of “wild west” where board members controlled the process).
274. See, e.g., MISSOURI PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE GRANTING OF PAROLES, supra
note 270, at 6 (describing the limited role of the inmate delegate, who may be a friend,
family member, or attorney).
275. See generally Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Order, Brown v. Precythe, 2019
WL 3752973 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 8, 2019) (No. 2:17-cv-04082-NKL).
276. See id.
277. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.131(10)(a) (West 2020) (providing generally
that individuals who will be seen by the parole board may be accompanied by counsel, at
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In Massachusetts and Connecticut, attorneys are provided to indigent
Miller-impacted inmates before the parole board.278 But in both states,
the role of counsel as advocate is greatly reduced as compared to a courtroom sentencing where a defendant is facing the possibility of the rest of
her life in prison.279 This is in part because of the amorphous role of prosecutors at these hearings.280 For instance, during an April 2018 Massachusetts sentence review hearing before parole officials, the prosecutor was
allowed to personally opine that the youthful offender had a look of
“pure evil” in his eyes at the time of his trial and that he “will kill again”
if released.281
3. Due Process and Individualization
Obviously, lack of defense counsel or limitations on representation,
along with the unusual role of prosecutor as witness, also impacts the
meaningfulness and adequacy of the process provided. But it is not just
inflammatory opinions of the prosecutor that result in unreliable evidence or unfairness in the proceedings. Many inmates are precluded from
seeing the contents of their correctional files or other materials that the
parole board may consider during its decision-making process.282 And in
states like Nevada, it appears board members may receive information
outside of the hearing itself.283
Parole boards historically have claimed to have special understanding
of rehabilitation and risk assessments of inmate reoffending. However,
their own expense); see also Katya Cengel, “You Guys Are Coming Home”, NATION (Jan.
9, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/juvenile-lwop-prison-california/ [https://perma
.cc/KK8A-FLME] (describing how volunteer youth advocates are working to help prepare
California youthful offenders to appear before the parole board pro se to seek possible
release).
278. See Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk, 1 N.E.3d 270, 287 n.18 (Mass. 2017)
(indicating public defenders would be expected to handle sentencing review proceedings
for Miller-impacted inmates before the Massachusetts parole board); see also CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 54-125a(f)(3) (West 2015).
279. See Renaud, supra note 224 (giving both Connecticut and Massachusetts grades of
“F,” in part because of the ability of prosecutor and victim to influence parole grant
proceedings).
280. See, e.g., Shaun Chaiyabhat, Parole Hearing for Man Convicted of Killing Family
40 Years Ago, WCVB-TV (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.wcvb.com/article/parole-hearingfor-man-convicted-of-killing-family-40-years-ago/20079081 [https://perma.cc/CS9T-ZJMT]
(video excerpts from parole board hearing, with transcript).
281. Id.
282. See, e.g., Rebecca Rivas, MacArthur Justice Center Files Lawsuit Against Missouri
Dept. of Corrections, Argues Parole Proceedings for Juvenile Offenders Are Unconstitutional, ST. LOUIS AMERICAN (Dec. 30, 2016), http://www.stlamerican.com/news/local_news/
macarthur-justice-center-files-lawsuit-against-missouri-dept-of-corrections/article_69d0cc
16-cee0-11e6-8339-87131f81103a.html [https://perma.cc/V9UR-ZNF6] (reporting on lawsuit in non-Miller youthful offender case which challenged Missouri parole board practice
of refusing to allow inmates to review information submitted by victims, notes of prison
staff, or any other information in file other than disciplinary record); see also ALEXIS LEE
WATTS ET AL., ROBINA INST., PROFILES IN PAROLE RELEASE AND REVOCATION: EXAMINING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN THE UNITED STATES: TENNESSEE 8 (2019) (“While the
Board has discretion to release some documents to offenders, it does not appear that they
are required to release the records used to make a parole decision.”).
283. See generally NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.131 (West 2020).
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such assertions are dubious at best given the quality of the risk assessment instruments administered and used in some states—as well as the
absolute lack of formal assessments in others.284 States like Missouri have
not been using formal risk assessment instruments in connection with
Miller sentence review hearings. Instead, an inmate interview is completed by a parole board staffer who may or may not have a college degree—let alone specialized psychological or risk assessment training.285
That staff member then offers a written report and opinion to the board
based upon that short interview, which is then relied upon during the
sentence review process by board members rendering a decision.286
After Missouri’s Miller-impacted youthful offenders prevailed on their
class action lawsuit against the parole board, the board offered to start
using formal risk assessment instruments. But it is not at all clear who
would administer them or how.287 In addition, it promised to have its staff
engage in more youth-focused inquiries before providing written opinions
to the board regarding issues like these: “What is the mitigating effect of
any details of their background? How did it impact their developmental
status at the time of crime? How did it impact their culpability? How did
it impact their capacity for rehabilitation?”288 Of course, presenting such
questions to a single parole staffer—who does not know the defendant,
the law, or have any training or guidance relevant to assessing such
weighty proportionality issues—allows that person to serve as a sort of
rogue, single juror operating on instincts rather than jury instructions.
Similarly, some states use risk assessment instruments that fail to adequately account for youth. In fact, under some risk tools, features of
youth are used as aggravating factors rather than mitigators.289 Others
are intended for adult offenders alone—not juveniles. Thus, risk assessment outcomes presented by parole staffers for youthful offenders can be
skewed and unreliable.290
Courtroom sentencing hearings do not afford defendants all the same
rights as at trial. But they receive far more process than what is provided
by parole boards generally—or in Miller-impacted matters specifically.
As noted, Supreme Court decisions from as early as the middle of the last
284. Cf. Alice Reichman Hoesterey, Confusion in Montgomery’s Wake: State Responses, the Mandates of Montgomery, and Why a Complete Categorical Ban on Life Without Parole for Juveniles Is the Only Constitutional Option, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 149, 188
(2017) (opining that “[a] future parole board, with the added knowledge that only comes
with time, will be in a better position to determine whether or not a juvenile can be
rehabilitated”).
285. See Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note
55, at ¶ 80.
286. Id.
287. Plan for Compliance with Applicable Requirements, supra note 241, at 10.
288. Id.
289. Kate Wheeling, Prisoners Sentenced to Life as Kids Get a Shot at Parole in California, PAC. STANDARD (Oct. 13, 2017), https://psmag.com/social-justice/california-bans-lifesentences-for-juvenile-offenders [https://perma.cc/RA8N-7D3G].
290. Id.; see also Caldwell, Creating Meaningful Opportunities for Release, supra note
29, at 299–302.
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century, including Townsend v. Burke, and more recently Gardner v.
Florida, set aside sentences based upon lack of due process when questionable information was presented or defense counsel was not provided
an opportunity to review and challenge evidence.291
It could be argued non-death penalty sentencing matters generally require less process than in capital cases. But the sentencing process provided in even run of the mill felony matters is greater than what is
provided in parole board hearings in Miller cases or otherwise. Moreover,
as Graham and Miller teach, any youthful offender cases where lifetime
incarceration may be possible is akin to a death case. Therefore, sufficient
narrowing and proportionality analysis is needed to determine the rare
youth who is irredeemable. Clearly, this is not occurring.
Parole board sentencing review processes also fail to allow for direct
appeal or meaningful post-hearing review.292 While each state is slightly
different, parole hearings as administrative proceedings do not allow for
the same kind of direct review as in criminal sentencing matters. Rather,
inmates are often instructed to seek further administrative relief through
the agency or that they have no right to challenge outcomes at all.293
Even where specialized rules or practices have been put in place for
Miller-fix parole board hearings, this has been the case.294 And while the
constitutional right to counsel during direct appeal in criminal cases applies,295 there is no similar right to counsel to challenge Miller-impacted
parole board outcomes.296 Instead, affirmative litigation seeking extraordinary relief is required.297
291. See supra Part III.B.
292. See SENTENCING REFORM IN OVERCROWDED TIMES, supra note 201, at 11
(“[S]entencing guidelines, backed up by appellate sentence review, can reduce racial, gender, and other unwanted disparities.”).
293. See Types of Hearings, LA. DEP’T PUB. SAFETY & CORR., https://doc.louisiana.gov/
types-of-hearings/ [https://perma.cc/T7K7-JVN6] (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (“[T]his process
does not establish a formal appeal process as parole is an administrative discretionary decision that is not subject to appeal.”); see also Parole Denial, PRISONERS’ LEGAL SERVS.
MASS., http://www.plsma.org/parole/parole-denial/ [https://perma.cc/5CGY-3XHC] (last
visited Nov. 5, 2019) (explaining that Massachusetts inmates’ right to appeal parole decisions involves seeking review within the parole system itself).
294. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-125a(f)(6) (West 2015) (providing that youthful
offender parole board sentence review hearing outcomes “shall not be subject to appeal”);
Rachel Lippmann, Parole Anything but Certain for Juvenile Lifers a Year After Missouri
Changed Law, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Aug. 3, 2017), https://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/
parole-anything-certain-juvenile-lifers-year-after-missouri-changed-law#stream/0 [https://
perma.cc/8TLK-JAZF] (article including a copy of Missouri Parole Board decision
paperwork from Miller sentencing review matter, noting “THIS DECISION IS NOT SUBJECT TO APPEAL”).
295. See Mae C. Quinn, Reconceptualizing Competence: An Appeal, 66 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 259, 289–90 (2009) (discussing constitutional right to appointed counsel in criminal
appeal matters despite lack of constitutional right to criminal appeal in the first instance).
296. See id.
297. See, e.g., Rivas, supra note 282; Alexis Watts & Edward E. Rine, Parole Board
Held in Contempt After Failing to Follow State’s Parole Release Laws, ROBINA INST. (June
6, 2016), https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/news-views/parole-board-held-contempt-afterfailing-follow-state’s-parole-release-laws [https://perma.cc/UCC9-EHGF].
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In summary, parole board punishment proceedings fall far short of delivering the constitutional procedural protections promised in a court of
law. Whether or not jury determinations would be required during an incourt hearing, the processes provided in parole proceedings generally,
and Miller-fix matters specifically, are insufficient to satisfy constitutional
procedural protections for sentencing.
D. SUBSTANTIVE SHORTCOMING

OF

PAROLE BOARD PENALTIES

Given the above descriptions, parole hearing processes also raise serious questions about satisfying substantive constitutional requirements
when it comes to juvenile life-without-parole review matters. Current
structures, staffing, and culture make parole boards ill-equipped to offer
individualized proportionality analyses to make sure youth will rarely be
incarcerated until the end of their lives. And examining the substantive
constitutional question of proportionality in the context of parole review
hearings highlights further incoherency inherent in the existing
arrangement.
1. Arbitrary, Discriminatory, or Cruel
Given the impact of Greenholtz, granting parole boards near carte
blanche to create release hearing mechanisms most entirely eschew formal legal standards. As will be further discussed below, it is the rare parole board member who has any legal training—let alone a law degree
that would provide an assurance of competence in legal analysis. This is
obviously the case as it pertains to the doctrines directly applicable to
criminal sentencing processes. Constitutional doctrines ancillary to criminal processes, such as equal protection, are likely even more foreign and
far afield from boards.298
Lack of training, belief that their actions are beyond challenge, and
other shortcomings provide a high risk that parole board members will
ask about, or take account of, facts that would be substantively prohibited
at a criminal sentencing. For instance, as the New Hampshire Parole
Board record above suggests, parole officials may inquire about mental
health diagnoses, disabilities, and other issues in a manner that would
surely trigger concerns in a courtroom setting, potentially rising to the
level of discrimination.299
This is no different in Miller-related sentence review cases. During the
April 2018 hearing in Massachusetts described above, parole board members told the youthful offender, “[Y]ou do have personality disorders that
298. See Beth Schwartzapfel, Nine Things You Probably Didn’t Know About Parole,
MARSHALL PROJECT (July 10, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/07/10/ninethings-you-probably-didn-t-know-about-parole [https://perma.cc/KK2A-6VPK] (“If you
are a farmer, auto salesman, DuPont executive or personal fitness trainer, you too can be
on a parole board.”); see also infra Part VI.A (further describing lack of legal training or
ethical mandates for parole board members).
299. See supra text accompanying notes 220–223.
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contribute [to your actions], but society would say, well so what,” and
then asserted incredulously, “[A]nd now you are here asking us to parole
someone who has mental health issues . . . .”300 Similarly, active substance
abuse might also be considered in the course of review hearings involving
the possibility of life without parole.301 Yet, as Robinson suggests, criminally punishing the disease of addiction with imprisonment is cruel, arbitrary, and prohibited in the criminal justice system.302
Given the lack of counsel in many of these hearings, mentally impaired
inmates may face direct or subtle forms of discrimination. Many of the
youth previously sentenced to life without parole were especially vulnerable to peer pressures because of brain damage, low IQ scores, or other
deficits considered disabilities.303 And these conditions may prevent such
inmates from fully understanding standard protocols or social cues; or
make them seem defiant, aloof, or even come across as disrespectful.304
Absent meaningful advocacy to ensure such issues around competence
are not used against clients, mentally disabled youthful offenders may
have their deficits used against them—essentially as aggravating factors
warranting denial of a sentence reduction.305
Inmates may also face discrimination before the parole board based
upon their poverty. Across the country, parole boards take account of
inmate reentry plans when reviewing requests for release. These focus to
a large degree on where the inmate plans to live if discharged.306 Some
states, like Nevada, may financially assist inmates in seeking housing
when they are unable to pay for it on their own.307 But this is not the
300. Chaiyabhat, supra note 280.
301. See supra note 280 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, illicit drugs and alcohol
are frequently introduced as contraband by prison staff and others. See, e.g., Sam Ruland,
Drugs in Crosswords and 5 Other Ways Prison Staff Allegedly Tried to Smuggle Contraband, YORK DAILY REC. (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.ydr.com/story/news/2019/03/18/pastate-prison-staff-guards-smuggling-drugs-6-ways-they-allegedly-tried/3138348002/ [https://
perma.cc/B6NH-NA7N].
302. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing Robinson).
303. ASHLEY NELLIS, SENT’G PROJECT, THE LIVES OF JUVENILE LIFERS: FINDINGS
FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY 8–13 (2012) (describing history of trauma, lack of education,
and mental health challenges of many youth serving life sentences).
304. Beth Schwartzapfel, The Secret Hints for Winning Parole, MARSHALL PROJECT
(Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/01/25/the-secret-hints-for-winningparole [https://perma.cc/PA7Q-NBTW] (noting how mentally ill, illiterate, and otherwise
vulnerable inmates may do most poorly during parole interviews, regardless of their level
of rehabilitation or readiness for release).
305. This author represented one youthful offender before the Missouri Parole Board
who had an IQ score reflecting intellectual disabilities. Absent attorney investigation and
participation, this fact and the inmate’s associated lack of comprehension would have not
been known by the board, which does not conduct psychological evaluations.
306. CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, PAROLE PREPARATION TOOLKIT 13 (2018) (providing advice for youthful offenders who may appear unrepresented
before parole boards after Graham and Miller, including how to develop re-entry housing
plans).
307. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.140 (West 2017) (“If a prisoner is indigent and the
prisoner’s proposed plan for placement upon release indicates that the prisoner will reside
in transitional housing upon release, the Division may, within the limits of available resources, pay for all or a portion of the cost of the transitional housing for the prisoner
based upon the prisoner’s economic need, as determined by the Division.”).
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norm, and most youthful offenders will not have money for transitional
housing.308 Thus, board members may wind up considering inmate poverty in a manner that would violate Williams v. Illinois in a courthouse
sentencing.309
As described above, in some states where parole boards have stepped
into the shoes of sentencing courts, review hearings are conducted in public and meaningfully recorded. Places like Missouri, however, conduct
hearings inside of prisons, outside of public view, and even preclude prisoners or their lawyers from accessing hearing transcripts as a matter of
course.310 Thus, attempting to bring to light prohibited sentencing bias or
discrimination, as contemplated by Williams and McCleskey, would be
next to impossible.311
Arbitrariness can further creep into parole board assessments in Millerfix cases through the layered and bureaucratic processes employed by
such agencies.312 From inflammatory claims of victims and prosecutors, to
incorrect information in parole files, to unsubstantiated “expert” opinions
about risk or maturation made by untrained staff, parole board decisions
may rest upon information that would be deemed wholly irrelevant or
unduly prejudicial during court proceedings.313
Similarly, such proof would not satisfy the preponderance standard applied at most individual sentencing hearings, much less the beyond a reasonable doubt bar that likely applies to Miller sentence matters where
lifetime incarceration is possible. The widespread nature of such practices
renders the parole system rife with the kind of randomness and caprice
that resulted in the Supreme Court’s ruling in Furman and the death penalty moratorium that followed.314
308. See generally NELLIS, supra note 303, at 36 (noting that most youth with life
sentences come from poor families who may not be able to financially support them upon
their release as adults).
309. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing Williams).
310. See Quandt, supra note 57 (reporting on the closed nature of Missouri parole hearings, even in Miller sentence review matters).
311. The limited number of transcripts that have been obtained in Missouri are of generally poor quality and fail to ensure all statements made are memorialized. For instance,
records relating to the “word game” hearings conducted by board member Ruzicka were
filled with notations that part of the proceedings were simply inaudible. See Bogan, supra
note 226.
312. Sarah French Russell, Review for Release: Juvenile Offenders, State Parole Practices, and the Eighth Amendment, 89 IND. L.J. 373, 376–77 (2014) [hereinafter French Russell, Review for Release] (describing ad hoc practices of parole boards, including
application of unwritten rules and agency norms at hearings).
313. See id.; see also Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 464–65 (1991) (in upholding federal drug sentencing structure for LSD as an illegal narcotic, the Court noted, “so
long as the penalty is not based on an arbitrary distinction,” it would not be unconstitutional); OFFICE OF THE LEGAL AUDITOR GEN., ST. OF UTAH, REP. TO THE UTAH LEGIS.:
A PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF THE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE, L. 2016-01, 1st Sess.,
at 21–29 (documenting the lack of transparency and possible errors in parole proceedings).
314. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing Furman); cf. Janet C. Hoeffel, The Jurisprudence
of Death and Youth: Now the Twain Should Meet, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 29, 66–68 (2013)
(urging application of Furman’s anti-arbitrariness principles to juvenile transfer hearings).
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2. Proportionality and Heightened Individualization
Although some parole board sentence review states, such as Massachusetts, have created special units or protocols for youthful offender cases,
underlying culture and thinking has changed little. No matter what the
board members claim, youthful characteristics at the time of the crime
may not be sufficiently weighed or understood, and subsequent maturation may not be meaningfully assessed.315 Other states, by and large, have
failed to create special juvenile parole board units.316 In fact, Missouri’s
parole board went so far as to decline free training on the adolescent
development process, offered by the Campaign for Fair Sentencing on
Youth—the nation’s leading organization dedicated to the issue of juvenile life without parole.317
To date, nothing suggests that parole boards handling Miller-fix matters
in lieu of sentencing courts are equipped to accurately evaluate “the difficult but essential question whether [those who appear before them] are
among the very ‘rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect
permanent incorrigibility.’”318 Connecticut, for instance, has its parole
board members apply two standard parole release considerations to
Miller-impacted matters but adds this additional set of factors for
consideration:
[S]uch person has demonstrated substantial rehabilitation since the
date such crime or crimes were committed considering such person’s
character, background and history, as demonstrated by factors, including but not limited to, such person’s correctional record, the age
and circumstances of such person as of the date of the commission of
the crime or crimes, whether such person has demonstrated remorse
and increased maturity since the date of the commission of the crime
or crimes, such person’s contributions to the welfare of other persons
through service, such person’s efforts to overcome substance abuse,
addiction, trauma, lack of education or obstacles that such person
may have faced as a child or youth in the adult correction system, the
opportunities for rehabilitation in the adult correctional system and
the overall degree of such person’s rehabilitation considering the na315. See supra notes 284–290 and accompanying text.
316. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-125a(f)(1) (West 2015) (establishing parole
board review hearings for offenders who committed crimes while under the age of eighteen); see also Katherine Barrett & Richard Greene, To Work on Parole Boards, No Experience Necessary, GOVERNING (Sept. 2016), https://www.governing.com/columns/smartmgmt/gov-parole-boards-hiring-decisions.html [https://perma.cc/4QXS-3RFV] (lamenting
that many parole boards are untrained in law and ill-equipped to make the kinds of decisions they are presented); Beth Schwartzapfel, How Parole Boards Keep Prisoners in the
Dark and Behind Bars, WASH. POST, (July 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/na
tional/the-power-and-politics-of-parole-boards/2015/07/10/49c1844e-1f71-11e5-84d5-eb37
ee8eaa61_story.html [https://perma.cc/8EWV-37FC].
317. The author had a conversation with Nikola Nable Juris, former policy attorney
with the Campaign for Fair Sentencing of Youth.
318. See Adams v. Alabama, 136 S. Ct. 1796, 1801 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(quoting Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016)).
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ture and circumstances of the crime or crimes.319
And this inquiry is conducted based only upon the following evidence
permitted by the same statute: (a) a statement by the youthful offender;
(b) statements, reports or documents submitted by his attorney; (c) statements of the victims; (d) a risk assessment instrument; (e) testimony from
a mental health professional or other witnesses the board might like to
hear from; and (f) reports from the Commissioner of Corrections.320
Rather than creating a presumption against the existing life-withoutparole sentence, these provisions clearly suggests the burden is on the
youthful offender to “demonstrate” all the many confusing requirements
set forth in the parole board review law. The statute offers parole board
members the ability to expand the universe of necessary showings with
language such as “including, but not limited to.” And it conflates disconnected concepts in ways that gut Miller’s meaning, such as equating demonstration of remorse with maturity. Worse, in trying to meet this
amorphous burden by some unknown quantum of proof, the defendant is
not able to call any witnesses to help prove he is worthy of a second
chance. Rather, he is limited to his own words and documentary evidence—unless the board itself asks to hear from a mental health expert
or receive other testimony.321
Sadly, it is obvious that sending cases to the parole board was motivated by convenience and approximation of Miller’s proportionality
promise. This can be seen in the explanation of the Connecticut court
when, post-Montgomery, it changed course and denied the request in Williams-Bey for trial court resentencing in a Miller-impacted matter.322 The
court expressed great concern about exposing the victims to “emotional
burdens” or requiring trial courts to hold complex or “cumbersome” resentencing hearings.323 Further, it claimed it would be “exceedingly difficult” for the trial judge to make the findings needed by Miller—because
the resentencing “would in reality be more akin to a parole hearing.”324
The difficulties—or unconstitutionality—of a parole board being transformed into an impromptu substitute judicial branch were not discussed.

319. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-125a(f)(4) (West 2015); see also Youth Offender
Hearings, CAL. DEP’T CORR. & REHAB., https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/bph/youth-offender-hear
ings-overview [https://perma.cc/GQ3P-GCF9] (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) [hereinafter California Youth Offender Hearings] (the parole review board is required to “give great weight
to factors specific to youth offenders,” but this is “in addition to the factors the Board must
consider at regular, non-youth offender parole hearings”).
320. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-125a(f)(3).
321. Id.
322. State v. Williams-Bey, 114 A.3d 467, 489–90 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016).
323. Id. at 488–89.
324. Id. at 488.
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VI. SYSTEMIC IMPLICATIONS OF PAROLE BOARD
PUNISHMENTS AND CALL FOR REFORM
These “close enough” or “second best” criminal punishment practices
have ramifications beyond the cases of individual Miller-impacted youthful offenders.325 There will be lasting effects for years to come given the
departure of these cases from criminal justice norms.326 They also raise
serious questions about the durability of our criminal justice system and
whether the right to sentencing in a court of law might give way in other
matters for the sake of convenience—or worse. Accordingly, this section
urges recommitment to trial court sentencing when requested. This is not
only to respect the constitutional rights of Miller-impacted inmates who
were unlawfully condemned to die behind bars as children but to protect
against further unfairness and erosion of time-honored justice system
principles.
A. CRIMINAL PRACTICE NORMS, PUBLIC APOLOGY,
AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Constitutionality aside, sending cases to parole boards for sentencing
flies in the face of a wide range of norms built into state criminal justice
systems over many decades.327 Such protocols shed professional conduct
requirements and ethical frameworks imposed on lawyers and judges
working within sentencing courts. They also conflict with existing criminal
code provisions, rules of procedure, and other expectations held by a
range of criminal justice system stakeholders.328 In these ways parole
board penalty phase proceedings further undermine the fairness that
should be afforded to Miller-impacted inmates—in addition to doing
damage to the integrity of our already challenged criminal justice system.
It is no secret that our state criminal court systems need improvement.
Racial bias, indiscriminate use of cash bail, and the imposition of fines
and fees on the indigent are all matters on the nation’s radar and are
being attacked by way of policy changes and civil rights prosecutions.329
These efforts have been undertaken by zealous attorneys, working in collaboration with impacted communities.330 And the calls for improvement
have informed the practices of prosecutors’ offices and even judicial
325. See generally Ortman, supra note 9.
326. See generally Bierschbach, supra note 168.
327. Cf. id.
328. See NORA V. DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY: CASES, STATUTES, AND GUIDELINES 405 (2004) (“While in some situations, constitutional rights (including any developing rights under Apprendi) may be an essential part of sentencing
process, in most cases the principle procedures will be nonconstitutional, guided by statute
and, to an even greater extent, by rules of procedure, prosecutorial policies, and local judicial culture.”).
329. See, e.g., Mae C. Quinn & Eirik Cheverud, Civil Arrest? (Another) St. Louis Case
Study in Unconstitutionality, 52 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 95, 95–96 (2016) (describing efforts
of activist attorneys to stand with protesters and others in the face of overzealous policing
and prosecution in the St. Louis region).
330. Id.
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trainings.331 In addition, even where court systems are flawed in their operations, individual attorneys maintain a duty to advance the causes of
their clients at sentencing;332 prosecutors are prohibited from trying to
win over seeking justice;333 and judges may be held to account for unethical behavior and misdeeds on and off the sentencing bench.334
Unfortunately, the same caveats cannot be offered for the broken parole system. Relatively speaking, particularly since Greenholtz, few attorneys file lawsuits to try to improve parole practices. Investigations and
press conferences like the one involving Ruzicka are the exception. And
challenges are largely brought by pro se inmates whose cases are quickly
dismissed on technical issues.335 This is in part because absent a constitutional mandate for counsel, parole release hearings remain far below the
law and lawyering radar.336 Most inmates lack resources to hire attorneys
to assist them; public defender services generally are not afforded for
these hearings; and just a few entities across the country—such as law
school clinics—will consider taking such cases without a fee.337
Beyond this, as noted, most parole boards are staffed by lay persons
who are not just non-judges,338 but who lack any meaningful legal training.339 The University of Minnesota’s Robina Institute recently found
that 19 of 45 states “had no mandated qualifications at all” for parole
board members.340 And “[o]f the 25 states that had mandated qualifica331. See, e.g., Ethics for Judges Tutorial: Bias or the Appearance of Bias—Ex. 2, UNIV.
N.M. SCH. L. JUD. EDUC. CTR., http://jec.unm.edu/education/online-training/ethics-for-jud
ges/discrimination-in-the-courtroom [https://perma.cc/927P-URRG] (last visited Nov. 5,
2019).
332. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983)
(“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”);
see also DAVID J. KEEFE, SEN’G PROJECT, SENTENCING ADVOCACY AND THE RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 12–14 (2003) (focusing on features of effective noncapital sentence advocacy in state courts); Hughes, supra note 116, at 343–47 and accompanying text (regarding death penalty sentencing advocacy).
333. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (“A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility
carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural
justice . . . .”).
334. See CYNTHIA GRAY, ST. JUST. INST., A STUDY OF STATE JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
SANCTIONS 1 (2002).
335. See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1588–89 (2003).
336. MISSOURI PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE GRANTING OF PAROLES, supra note 270,
at 6 (describing the limited role of the inmate delegate, who may be a friend, family member, or attorney). See generally Plan for Compliance with Applicable Requirements, supra
note 241.
337. See, e.g., Representation at Hearings, PRISONER LEGAL SERVS. MASS., http://www
.plsma.org/parole/representation-at-parole-hearings/ [https://perma.cc/7LS6-NR4E] (last
visited Nov. 5, 2019) (informing inmates that they generally do not have a right to counsel
at a parole grant hearing, but that some law school clinics might provide free representation); see also JESSICA STEINBERG & KATHRYN RAMSEY, PAROLE PRACTICE MANUAL FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 1–2 (2018) (extensive manual for volunteer and other attorneys handling parole cases in the District of Columbia).
338. Gavin Rozzi, Lesniak Calls State Parole Board “Dumping Ground” for Patronage,
OCEAN CTY. POLITICS (June 22, 2016), https://politicsoc.com/2016/06/lesniak-says-state-pa
role-board-dumping-ground-patronage/ [https://perma.cc/YR2K-MXT2].
339. See Barrett & Greene, supra note 316.
340. Id.
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tions, 10 required a college degree but no pertinent experience. Only 14
required some years of experience in criminal justice or aligned fields of
endeavor.”341 Thus, lawyer and judicial ethics norms fail to serve as a
floor to maintain professionalism and legal standards in the parole hearing room or beyond—as is the case in courtroom sentence proceedings.
Similarly, although they may not yet rise to the level of constitutional
guarantees,342 criminal defendants across the country are provided with
public sentencing hearings and the right of allocution.343 Yet, states that
have bypassed court penalty phase hearings in favor of parole board sentence review do not necessarily respect these time-honored expectations.344 For instance, as already noted, some states conduct parole
hearings in private, denying defendants the experience of sentence proceedings that are mostly open to public view and scrutiny. In these ways,
such proceedings are shrouded in secrecy and prevent the community
from seeing, hearing, or understanding the process.345
In addition, the broad latitude afforded parole boards under Greenholtz has resulted in defendants appearing before parole boards via video
camera and having very limited time to make their case.346 But court sentencing hearings have historically respected a defendant’s right to in-person and individualized allocution on all issues relating to punishment.347
This might include clarification about the facts of the crime, evidence in
mitigation, or powerful statements of remorse. But this practice, too, has
been hampered by the administrative “assembly line” parole process. In
these ways and others, parole review hearings may fail to allow for individualized holistic reckoning on the part of the youthful offenders in
Miller cases348 or deny the victim the opportunity to receive an authentic
apology.349
341. Id.
342. See generally David A. Hoffman, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Confrontation Rights, 42 DUKE L.J. 382 (1992).
343. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Thomas, Beyond Mitigation: Towards a Theory of Allocution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2641, 2678–79 (2007) (noting sentencing hearings are open to
the public to allow transparency and public engagement).
344. Even the most recent draft of the Sentencing Provisions for the Model Penal
Code—written by current judges and legal scholars—talks about discretion for individual
sentences residing within the trial court system, not an administrative agency. MODEL PENAL CODE, SENTENCING § 7.XX (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017).
345. See id.
346. See, e.g., Parole Hearing Schedule for July 2019, CONN. BD. PARDONS & PAROLES
(July 2019), https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/BOPP/Hearings/Parole-Hearings/July_2019
.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/BXJ5-WU87].
347. See Mark W. Bennett & Ira P. Robbins, Last Words: A Survey and Analysis of
Federal Judges’ Views on Allocution in Sentencing, 65 ALA. L. REV. 735, 741 (2014) (dating
back to 1600s England, allocution was embraced in the United States in 1940s).
348. Id. at 778 (summing up the importance of allocution with the following quote from
a sentencing judge: “There are no magic words. There is no formulaic correct allocution.
Every case is different and the suggestion that there is some type of ‘best’ way takes away
from the individualistic nature of sentencing.”).
349. See Jean HAMPTON, A NEW THEORY OF RETRIBUTION, IN LIABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN LAW AND MORALS 377, 404, 412 (R.G. Frey & Christopher W.
Morris eds., 1991). Indeed, in Missouri, Miller-impacted inmates and their counsel have
been instructed not to direct statements or apologies to the victim but to look straight
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To be certain, procedural justice can present its own problems as a theory and mode of operating.350 Form over substance and impressions over
reality can paper over deep-rooted problems in the justice system.351 For
those reasons, procedural justice considerations should not singularly
drive legal outcomes or structures. But sentencing or resentencing
processes that undermine everyone’s faith in the system—victims, defendants, attorneys, and the public alike—surely should be avoided. Such
is the situation presented by parole board punishment practices currently.
B. MILLER MATTERS AS SUI GENERIS OR SECOND-BEST
SENTENCING SENTINELS?
Parole board sentence review hearings in Miller relief matters present
another set of significant concerns for the justice system. Parole boards
take no action to address underlying orders or commitment mandates
that set forth unconstitutional mandatory terms of life without parole.352
Indeed, they have no power to modify or issue a proper criminal sentencing “judgment” in the manner described by the Supreme Court as early
as 1830 in Ex Parte Watkins.353 And yet, somehow these administrative
agencies are supposed to review and then amend the mandatory deathbehind-bars sentences of youthful offenders if they determine that such
sentences are inappropriate. This presents an irreconcilable catch-22.
This dilemma was astutely presented in a recent public letter to the
press by Cedrik Clerk, one of Missouri’s Miller-impacted inmates who
still awaits relief. He wrote: “How can we possibly make parole on a life
without parole sentence?”354
On one hand, it might be argued that these cases are really no different
from ordinary life sentence matters. Except, of course, inmates like Clerk
have not appeared in court for a sentence modification that imposes a
single life sentence. Moreover, this claim only brings into sharper focus
an underlying conundrum created by juvenile life sentence matters after
Graham, Miller, and Montgomery.
ahead and address the parole board only. Again, this is based upon the actual experience
of this author.
350. See generally Mae C. Quinn, “Post-Ferguson” Social Engineering: Problem-Solving
Justice or Just Posturing, 59 HOW. L.J. 739 (2016).
351. See id.
352. See, e.g., California Youth Offender Hearings, supra note 319 (nothing that inmates
who were under the age of eighteen when they committed their controlling offense and
who were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole are eligible for a parole hearing
during their twenty-fifth year of incarceration).
353. Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193, 193 (1830).
354. Cedric Clerk, Missouri Ignores US Supreme Court Ruling Requiring Resentencing
of Prisoners Given Life Without Parole as Juveniles, S.F. BAY VIEW (July 20, 2017), https://
sfbayview.com/2017/07/missouri-ignores-us-supreme-court-ruling-requiring-resentencingof-prisoners-given-life-without-parole-as-juveniles/ [https://perma.cc/B6C2-5MVA]; see
also State v. Williams-Bey, 144 A.3d 467, 490 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016) (“[T]he case is remanded with direction to render judgment denying the defendant’s motion to correct an
illegal sentence.”).
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On the other hand, Graham suggests that youth sentenced to ordinary
life sentences need to be provided only with a meaningful opportunity of
release—not necessarily actual release.355 But Miller goes further, providing the state is precluded from keeping any youthful offender behind bars
until their death—absent a finding of “irreparable corruption.”356 But
none of the inmates being sent directly to parole boards have had a full
and meaningful sentencing hearing where irreparability was found beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, this part of the Court’s proportionality standard for juvenile defendants is not being applied. And there is
nothing to stop parole boards from holding these youthful offenders until
they die. Thus, whether they might look like ordinary life sentence matters means very little in the context of Miller youthful offender cases.
If the response to Clerk’s question is that the status of these cases is
ambiguous or in flux, this just highlights one of the original arguments
advanced in Missouri to challenge Senate Bill 590—that parole agencies
appear to be operating not just as courts but as a quasi-legislature. They
are selecting terms to be served in individual cases while also creating
unwritten sentencing schemes from whole cloth. And Miller-impacted
youthful offenders are, therefore, living in legal limbo behind bars with
no lawful sentence order or term in place at all.357 Such a grave state of
affairs presents a further affront to our justice system as a whole—in addition to violating the rights of Miller-impacted inmates who remain unlawfully imprisoned without a clear sentence or remedy.
A final response to the arguments presented here might be that Millerimpacted youthful offenders are a unique group of defendants whose situation is sui generis. Given that they are an exception, then we should not
be concerned; the problems presented by their cases will not be seen
again in our justice system. It is true that parole board punishments are
currently occurring in only a narrow band of cases that have unique features. But absent embrace of the constitutional analyses advanced by this
article regarding a fundamental right to sentencing in a court of law, there
appears to be no impediment to using parole board punishment proceedings in other kinds of cases.
That is, if parole board punishments are permitted here—in some of
the most sensitive, specialized, and conceptually complex matters in the
justice system—state legislatures surely would not be constitutionally
prohibited from delegating ultimate sentencing power to parole boards in
other less serious criminal cases. This could allow wide-spread departure
from long-standing practices of public hearing, defendant allocution, judicial oversight of the penalty phase, and the other time-honored expectations addressed above. This systemic implication alone suggests current
practices in Miller-impacted matters must be reconsidered.
355. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010).
356. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2012).
357. See supra note 355 and accompanying text.
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C. SOME POSSIBLE PATHS FORWARD
Many fine scholars, some of whom have been on the front lines of
Miller implementation litigation for many years, have grappled with the
challenges presented by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Graham,
Miller, and Montgomery—trying to make sense of the Court’s various rulings. Among other things, they helped shed light on the informality of
parole processes that could undermine the right to a “meaningful opportunity for release” post-Graham, the lack of juvenile justice expertise
among parole staff, and the difficulty of trying to square the special proportionality considerations mandated by Miller with administrative, postsentencing practices of parole boards.358
Read together, these analyses have also helped to drive home the doctrinal problem of reconciling a mere promise of potential release, as offered by Graham, with the requirement in Miller that only the rare
juvenile may be deemed to be wholly irredeemable such that they may be
held behind bars until death. But to date, scholars have not considered
the further emerging constitutional crisis identified in this article—when
contemporary parole boards formally displace the judicial branch to actually become the state sentencing body. This development exacerbates an
already nearly impossible situation.
As described in the earlier sections above, the individualized and proportionality-protecting penalty phase required by Miller in life-withoutparole cases has been wholly and very clearly sacrificed for convenience.359 The same is true for all other constitutional, statutory, and
other criminal justice system protections provided at sentencing in ordinary criminal cases. These things have been replaced with rough approximations of process—in cases that are already mired in the conundrums
and conceptual confusion identified by others who have attempted to reconcile Graham, Miller, and Montgomery for purposes of court sentencing
processes and post-sentencing parole review.360
Thus, to be sure, current parole boards and their practices lack credibility and accountability. Parole grant hearings must be infused with additional standards and due process features. And executive branch parole
358. See Cohen, supra note 272, at 1031; Perry L. Moriearty, Miller v. Alabama and the
Retroactivity of Proportionality Rules, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 929, 976 (2015) (explaining
that Miller “restored sentencing discretion to the trial courts” in addition to compelling
courts to “take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel
against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison”); Thomas & Reingold, supra
note 171, at 249 (“The due process protections extended (or not extended) at parole should
reference, if not parallel, the protections extended (or not) at sentencing.”); see also French
Russell, Review for Release, supra note 312, at 373–74.
359. See, e.g., State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 241 (Mo. 2013) (“The trial court on remand
will be in the best position to craft whatever instructions will best ensure that the jury’s
determination is guided by and firmly rooted in the type of circumstances and factors discussed throughout Miller and that the jury’s determination, therefore, will be the product
of the individualized assessment that Miller holds is guaranteed to juvenile offenders by
the Eighth Amendment.”).
360. See supra notes 321 and accompanying text; see also Mary Marshall, Note, Miller v.
Alabama and the Problem of Prediction, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1633, 1635 (2019).
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agents need additional training in constitutional law, adolescent development, and other subjects.361 But no matter what states do to try to improve the integrity of their parole systems—and again, much needs to be
done, as these cases have helped to demonstrate—this simply will not
make up for unilaterally denying inmates their fundamental right to be
sentenced in a court of law, along with all of the process and protection
that such a proceeding would entail, when requested.
Now it may be that some Miller-impacted inmates are granted release
when they appear before parole boards for purposes of sentence review.
For these defendants, the fact that they have not been formally resentenced may not present an immediate concern.362 Provided with their liberty, they may be willing to waive their right to further formal court
process. But Miller-impacted youthful offenders who have been denied
release following parole board sentence review—which has been the vast
majority of Miller-impacted inmates so far363—or who want to be formally resentenced before appearing before a parole board should be permitted the opportunity to have their cases remanded for purposes of a
lawful hearing in a court of law. Such resentencing hearings should include jury fact-finding, appointed counsel, robust due process protections—as well as application of the special narrowing and juvenile
proportionality considerations provided by Miller. Thereafter, depending
upon the sentence imposed by the judicial branch, they should be afforded continuing parole board assessments for possible early release that
continues to account for the defendant’s youthful characteristics.
It might be argued that the situation could be rectified with simple judicial review of Miller-impacted matters after the parole board penalty
phase. Indeed, a similar course has been recommended by scholars Dirk
van Zyl Smit and Catherine Appleton in their recent work: for all persons
361. Brianna Weis, Note, Meaningful Opportunity for Release: Parole Board Standards
for Juveniles Under the Graham, Miller, and the Eighth Amendment 14–20 (Feb. 1, 2019)
(unpublished manuscript), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=3327612 [https://perma.cc/4A75-873S].
362. There is, of course, the long-term concern of just how long they may remain on
parole. That is, what is their sentence term? And if they are to violate parole, do they face
reincarceration until death based upon their current underlying sentence order reflecting a
mandatory life without parole prison term? See, e.g., Order at 1, Lotts v. Steele, No. SC
97025 (Mo. July 3, 2018).
363. See Sarah Lustbader & Vaidya Gullapalli, Missouri’s Parole Board Can No Longer
Ignore the Rehabilitation of People Sentenced to Life Without Parole, APPEAL (Oct. 16,
2018), https://theappeal.org/missouris-parole-board-can-no-longer-ignore-the-rehabilita
tion-of-people-sentenced-to-juvenile-life-without-parole/ [https://perma.cc/3PLW-HX6T]
(reporting that 85% of Miller-impacted inmates who appeared before the board for sentence review were denied release); see also A State-by-State Look at Juvenile Life Without
Parole, supra note 51 (as of 2017, only 17 of the 210 youthful offenders qualified for parole
review in Connecticut were released; in Massachusetts, 10 of 63 were paroled); Samantha
Michaels, The Supreme Court Said No More Life Without Parole for Kids. Why Is Antonio
Espree One of the Few to Get Out of Prison?, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 26, 2018), https://www
.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2018/12/tony-espree-cyntoia-brown-mandatory-life-with
out-parole-juvenile-lifers-justice-kennedy-miller-alabama/ [https://perma.cc/C8HUWLUQ] (“Of the roughly 2800 juvenile lifers serving time in 2016, only about 400 have
been freed.”).
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serving any kind of life sentence, “[j]udicial review of the decisions of
parole boards is particularly important if the criteria that they are supposed to apply are not stated clearly.”364 But, of course, in the van Zyl
Smit and Appleton scenario, adult offenders who are serving ordinary life
sentences have already had the opportunity for a full and constitutional
sentencing hearing in a court of law. And when it comes to youthful offender cases, absent a de novo sentencing hearing, it is unclear what exactly a reviewing court would be reviewing. Given the near absolute
discretion provided parole boards and the heightened narrowing and proportionality process needed in Miller matters, what standards would apply when looking for errors or reasons to reverse the parole board’s
determination? Moreover, a similar process method has been described
as fairly meaningless when applied in death penalty cases. Critics have
reported that proportionality reviews in death penalty matters have become perfunctory, and that arbitrary and capricious outcomes continue
with official imprimatur.365
This article is primarily concerned with assuring the constitutional right
to sentencing hearings in a court of law if requested by the defendant and
preventing the further unilateral deployment of executive branch parole
board punishments. But there may be a straightforward resolution for the
remaining Miller-impacted matters—and other youthful offender cases.
That is, commutation or sentence modification reflecting a single term of
years of somewhere between fifteen and twenty-five years’ incarceration,
depending upon what is currently provided by the state’s statutory
scheme.366 Such a remedy, while at first blush might seem radical, could
be accomplished by way of gubernatorial clemency or agreed sentencing

364. VAN ZYL SMIT & APPLETON, supra note 166, at 255.
365. See, e.g., Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn, Proportionality Review and the Death Penalty, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 257, 270 (2008).
366. There might be some argument that a determinate term of between fifteen and
twenty-five years does not comport with the sentencing schemes in place at the time of the
crimes committed by the currently incarcerated, Miller-impacted inmates. For instance,
when the mandatory life without parole language is struck from Missouri’s sentencing
scheme, what remains is an option of between ten and thirty years’ incarceration or ordinary life imprisonment (which, under the law at the time of the charged crimes might allow
for release before twenty-five years). See supra note 59 and accompanying text. However,
by and large, this still places Miller-impacted inmates in a better position than they are
now. In addition, agreed sentencing to such a term with a local prosecutor or gubernatorial
action along these lines should not trigger ex post facto considerations. See NAZGOL
GHANDNOOSH, SENT’G PROJECT, THE NEXT STEP: ENDING EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENT FOR
VIOLENT CRIMES 17 (2019), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/the-next-stepending-excessive-punishment-for-violent-crimes/ [https://perma.cc/3YN7-34LD] (reporting
on actions of Jerry Brown, the Attorney General of California who has commuted a number of life sentences and granted relief for youthful offenders). But see States Adopt Sentencing Changes Following Supreme Court Ruling on Juvenile Lifers, PRISON LEGAL NEWS
(May 19, 2014), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2014/may/19/states-adopt-sentencing-changes-following-supreme-court-ruling-juvenile-lifers/ [https://perma.cc/L87D-F5XC]
(reporting that Iowa courts set aside effort by Iowa governor to commute juvenile life
without parole sentences to sixty-year term).
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orders with local prosecutors, as is already happening in some states.367 It
would also be far less costly than the current state of affairs.
At this time, most of the states using parole board sentence reviews in
Miller cases, in place of court sentencing, have settled upon terms of between fifteen or twenty-five years as a time for release application.368
Such a determinate term also allows for both defendant accountability
and maturation. For those who have already completed such lengthy
terms, immediate “time served” sentences in the trial court could be substituted for their currently unconstitutional sentences. And indeed, such
determinate terms appear to be the right resolution, not just for those
youthful offenders who were unconstitutionally sentenced to mandatory
life-without-parole terms, but for any youth serving any life sentence or a
de facto equivalent.
Given the Supreme Court’s findings in Roper, Graham, and Miller, as
well as subsequent legislative enactments signaling the significance of
such periods, it is hard to imagine that any sentence of beyond fifteen to
twenty-five years would be an appropriate sanction for criminal conduct
of any child at this point—or that any additional time would be needed to
complete the maturation and rehabilitation process contemplated by the
Court. Moreover, given the current unfortunate state of affairs of our
nation’s parole system, it is hard to imagine parole staff adding value to
rehabilitation with post-release supervision of these youthful offenders.
Thus, reasonable determinate terms would help end, once and for all, trying to determine the meaning of life for youthful offenders,369 while helping head off at the pass the continuing use of unconstitutional parole
board punishments.
VII. CONCLUSION
While the nation focuses on the somewhat shocking unilateral expansion and deployment of executive branch actions on the federal level, another unexpected although much more muted turn is occurring on the
state executive branch level. In the wake of Miller v. Alabama, some
states have side-stepped the long-understood venue of sentencing—trial
courts—to place punishment decision-making into the hands of parole
agency bureaucrats. To be sure, parole boards have become a relatively
regular part of the correctional landscape in this country, sharing some
367. See GHANDNOOSH, supra note 366, at 40 (describing “bold action” taken by Philadelphia’s new District Attorney, Larry Krasner, who is making reasonable “resentencing
offers in juvenile life-without-parole cases”).
368. See, e.g., Diatchenko v. Dis. Attorney for Suffolk, 1 N.E.3d 270, 286 (Mass. 2013)
(providing for parole review at fifteen years); supra note 62 and accompanying text (noting
Missouri Miller-impacted inmates may seek parole board sentence review at twenty-five
years).
369. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Mathena v. Malvo, No. 18-217 (U.S. argued Oct.
16, 2019) (oral argument relating to juvenile offender Lee Boyd Malvo’s potential right to
resentencing following imposition of life without parole sentences based upon his role in
the D.C. “sniper” incident, reflecting Court’s apparent disagreement about the meaning of
its prior precedent).
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part in release decisions in some jurisdictions for already sentenced inmates. But they have never previously been empowered to serve as criminal sanctioners in the first instance.
Although this is currently occurring in only a narrow band of cases—
those involving youthful offenders entitled to sentencing relief under
Miller v. Alabama—the implications are significant and potentially farreaching. It is, therefore, important to ensure that this practice is not allowed to take further hold to displace sentencing courts across America.
As this article has explained, such recommitment would not be at all
remarkable. Court-based sentencing has been the norm in this country
for nearly two centuries. And most already believe that it is a fundamental component of the criminal process under our constitutional form of
government. But the Supreme Court has never expressly made such a
finding—nor have legal scholars directly addressed this foundational sentencing question.
The move to expressly designate courts as the branch of government
singularly empowered to impose criminal penalties naturally flows from
several already existing strands of constitutional jurisprudence. First, it
grows from our nation’s commitment to the practice, which derives from
the penumbral features of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Second, federal separation of powers helps formalize implied understandings
that state judicial branches hold the power to pronounce sentences in the
first instance. Finally, such recommitment is wholly consistent with each
of the individual constitutional protections the Court has extended to
state court sentencing proceedings by way of the incorporation doctrine.
Indeed, given the ad hoc and problematic nature of many parole board
practices—many making front page news over the last decade—it is clear
courts of law should be favored as sentencing venues, even as a matter of
pure public policy. To be sure, our nation’s courts are in no way perfect
arbiters of justice. But they are the far superior choice, compared to parole agencies, when it comes to the important task of imposition of criminal punishments.
Sentencing as a critical stage of the criminal process should occur in a
public courtroom overseen by professional jurists trained in the law and
include due process protections and the right to counsel. Absent an affirmative waiver of sentencing rights by defendants, agency actors should
not be allowed to unilaterally impose criminal sanctions in processes that
lack fundamental fairness, legal ethics mandates, or protections against
arbitrariness in Miller-impacted matters or any other. Therefore, currently incarcerated Miller-impacted youthful offenders should either be
provided with sentencing hearings, if they wish, or released upon completion of a determinate term of between fifteen and twenty-five years. This
will stop executive branch actors from serving in a sentencing role for
which they are constitutionally incapable. It will also bring to an end the
current conceptual morass that is retroactive Miller implementation.370
370. See id.

